Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎157r] (314/540)

[ 10178 ] b 6
11
throughout embarrassing. Ibn Saud continued to bombard them with his
grievances. They were all the more reduced to replying with counsels of
moderation, as the Italian Government took the situation seriously and, true to
their friendship for the Imam, laid all the blame for it on Ibn Baud’s past
aggression, as they considered his annexation of Asir to have been. The Italians
refused to budge from this attitude, though they were willing to give in their
turn counsels of moderation to the Imam.
44. Both the rulers directly concerned were very ready to meet counsels of
moderation with declarations of pacific intention and to correspond with each
other direct, but they both proceeded to concentrate forces in their frontier areas,
so that by the end of August each had made not inconsiderable preparations for
a possible war. From that time to the end of the year the exchanges of telegrams
continued in spurts and the military preparations more steadily. It is impossible
to estimate in Jedda the number or military value of the Imam’s forces at any
given time. Ibn Saud, however, put forward what may be regarded as the
maximum effort possible. He sent large parties to the front both by land and
sea, built up reserves in the Hejaz and in Nejd, and used all his powers of
persuasion and intimidation to ensure the support of his tribes, some of whom
were reported to have little stomach for distant fighting. One of his nephews, the
Amir Feysal-bin-Saad (not Saud) was made Commander-in-chief at Abha in
September, and it was suggested that the Heir Apparent might be sent to replace
him, if need arose. On the 19th October, the Minister of Finance, who, in the
absence of Fuad Bey Hamza, had been acting as intermediary between the King
and His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires, foreshadowed the completion of the Saudi
military preparations in about a week, the issue thereupon of an ultimatum to
the Imam, and an offensive, through Najran in the first instance, if the ultimatum
were rejected. The Saudi Government proceeded to get ready a Green Book, to
be published if war should break out.
45. No formal ultimatum was issued. Its place would appear to have been
taken by a stiff telegram on the 10th November, in which Ibn Saud once more
restated his demands and called upon the Imam to define his attitude. After
some delay, the Imam replied agreeing to come into conference, but ignoring the
request for a definition of his attitude on the points regarding which the King
sought a preliminary understanding. This correspondence nevertheless paved the
way for further communications, as a result of which the situation appeared to
be taking a more favourable turn. On the 10th December Fuad Bey described
it to Mr. Calvert in terms which foreshadowed the possibility of a settlement on
two points. On the 28th December, although there had been some sinister rumours
in the interval, he defined it on similar lines, but more precisely, to
Sir Andrew Ryan. His language was on the whole hopeful, but he intimated that
thore would still be a casus belli unless the Imam agreed to the King’s then latest
proposal about Najran.
46. The points insisted upon by Ibn Saud were explained in different terms
on different occasions, but they seemed to turn throughout on four subjects,
namely, (a) measures to put a stop to the anti-Saudi machinations of which
the Idrisi was still accused; (b) Najran; (r) the cessation of intrigues by the
Imam’s emissaries in certain areas; and (d) a frontier agreement to be recorded
in a proper treaty. As regards (a), Ibn Saud was at first inclined to renew his
former demand for the surrender of the Idrisi, but in December he was satisfied
with a promise that the Idrisi, and apparently his relatives, would be relegated
to Zebid, well away from the frontier. As regards (5), Ibn Saud at first simply
demanded the evacuation of Najran, but his final proposal in December was that
the Imam should evacuate it on the understanding that he himself would not
occupy it, and that, if any trouble should occur in what would thus become a sort
of neutral buffer area, the two rulers should concert measures. As regards (c),
Ibn Saud’s grievance seemed to relate more especially to the country of the
Beni Malik and the Abadil, a part of the mountainous area mentioned in
paragraph 42 above. It was difficult to make out in 1933 what the exact trouble
was, but, in order to get the picture in its true proportions, it is necessary to
state here, in anticipation of the next report, that early in 1934 the dispute over
the Beni Malik and the Abadil proved to have become a capital factor in the whole
quarrel. The Saudi Government accused the Imam of having, in spite of many