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fair promises, fomented a revolt of the local tribes or allowed it to be fomented
by his subordinates and Abdul Wahhab-al-Idrisi. It was suggested, but less
confidently, that Yemeni troops had entered the area. As regards (d), Ibn Saud’s
objective was to commit the Imam to recognition of his position in lihamat Asir
and the hinterland. According to Fuad Bey’s statement on the 28th December,
the Imam had then expressed readiness to do this and to conclude a treaty for jp*
twenty years, a limitation which would not, however, in Fuad Bey’s view, leave
the Imam free to reopen the frontier question at the end of that time. The outlook
at the end of the year was that, if the Najran difficulty could be surmounted,
delegates of both parties would meet to reduce what had been agreed to
treaty form.
47. This rapid review necessarily ignores numerous details of a situation
which evolved, at times very foggily, over a period of many months. It is
necessary to say a few words as to what actually happened in Najran, so far as
is known. The Yemeni forces appear to have had a set-back in their first
operations in the early summer. Returning to the charge, they advanced and
occupied, probably in July, a place called Badr, which would appear to be a centre
of religious importance and is said to be situated about 20 miles south-east
of the intersection between latitude 18° N. and longitude 44° E. Eventually
they were so pressed by the tribes that they evacuated, probably early in November,
the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Habuna Valley, and withdrew after having razed Badr to the ground.
The geography of the region is so uncertain that it is impossible to say whether
this retreat meant a complete evacuation of Najran. All that need be added is
that the conflict against the Yemenis was throughout sustained by the local
tribesmen themselves, except that at one moment, probably early in December,
neighbouring Wahhabis lent them a hand. The facts of the episode are obscure.
Fuad Bey, when admitting with some coyness that it had happened, stated that
the interveners, though in sympathy with Ibn Baud, were not part of his
accredited forces.
Historical and Legal Aspects of the Dispute.
48. Something must be added about the legal merits of the dispute, if only
because the Italian Government have been disposed to support the Imam, not
only on grounds of general policy, but on juridical or quasi-juridical grounds.
Any attempt to study the legal issues must necessarily be tentative, as they turn
largely on historical considerations, which cannot be fully explored, and on
agreements, or alleged agreements, of which there is very little precise knowledge.
49. Here again it is necessary to give separate consideration to each of the
three areas mentioned in paragraph 42 above, but before doing so it will be well
to dispose of one argument, which has greatly impressed the Italian Government
and which, if valid, might affect not only Tihamat Asir, but also the highlands
further inland and possibly Najran. It is that Asir is proved to have been part
of the Yemen by the fact that in Turkish times it formed part of the Vilayet of
the Yemen. There is in this a great confusion of thought. It may be admitted
that in old days Asir was geographically part of the Yemen. It is probable that
the political control of past Imams extended to it. There is, however, no evidence
that when the Turks reasserted themselves in that part of Arabia over sixty years
ago the Imam had any such control. It is true that when the Turks constituted
the Vilayet of the Yemen in 1872 Asir was included in it as a sanjak. The
vilayet was, however, a Turkish administrative unit, not a territory of the Imam.
The Turks never effectively occupied the whole area, but they were from that
time on internationally recognised as the sovereign Power. Their authority,
never perhaps very secure, was eventually challenged very definitely by two
distinct rebels with distinct historical pretensions, the Imam in the Yemen
proper and the Idrisi in Asir. Each rebellion had to be tackled as a separate
political and military proposition. The Turks were so alive to this that in, or
soon after, 1909 they made the Asir a separate administrative unit. In 1911
they effected a composition with the Imam, by which he obtained a measure
of autonomy. This did not involve the withdrawal of a Turkish Vali, nor did
it involve any recognition of the Imam’s authority over Asir, when the Turks
were up against the Idrisi.
V-U.