Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎168v] (337/540)

34
1932. It is not clear how definite a line can now be drawn between them and the
tribal contingents, whose response depends a great deal on the attitude of their
chiefs. When making his preparations against the Yemen in the autumn of
1933, Ibn Saud had to put a good deal of pressure on certain tribes, but fear of
his power and personality seems, on the whole, to have prevailed over the
unwillingness of some tribes to go to a distant and dangerous front, with littl^^,,,
certain prospect of the reward of loot. The townsmen are reputed to be hardy^*^
fighters, to be relied on at a pinch as rather in the nature of a final reserve.
146. Even so slight a classification can only be attempted with great
diffidence. The difficulty is not that Ibn Saud’s forces have no organisation, but
that the organisation is entirely different from anything familiar to European
minds. It is known, for instance, to be a definite part of his system to maintain
large packs of camels at suitable places where they can be fed inexpensively, but
it is hard to say who are mounted on the camels, when they are required for
warfare.^ No very great additions appear to have been made to armament in
1933. 1 he most definite items of information were a statement made in Bagdad
by the German export manager of a firm at Bilbao that Ibn Saud, having
previously bought 3,000 “Astra” automatic pistols, had in November 1932
ordered a further consignment of 10,000; and that Mr. Philby had arranged with
the suppliers of the arms, &c., bought in Poland in 1930 to collaborate in the
reorganisation of the Government workshop in Mecca, so as to facilitate the
repair of existing weapons.
t 147 - It is still impossible to speak of a Saudi navy; but in 1933 the
Government put into working order a large launch, the Bakura, which had been
in Jedda harbour for some time and was thought to be useless; and in September
they bought two more motor craft in Bahrein, similar to that mentioned in
paragraph 138 of the report for 1932. Thus at the end of 1933 the Government
possessed four small vessels, which, though negligible as a fleet, were quite useful
for transporting moderate numbers of troops by sea to Asir.
VI. —Aviation and Connected Matters.
Air Force.
148. The position remained completely stationary throughout the year, as
regards any effective arrangements; that is to say, the existing aircraft remained
m hangars, where they have at most been kept greased, and there was no expert
personnel. Reference is made in paragraph 94 to the apparent petering-out of
the suggestion that the Turkish Government might help and in paragraph 77 to
the more recent suggestion that France might provide an air mission.
Landing-grounds on the Hasa Coast.
149. The proposals made by His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom in December 1932 were countered, after unimportant interludes, by a
memorandum which Fuad Bey Hamza handed to Sir Andrew Ryan on the
20th June, 1933. The Saudi Government wished all landing-grounds, except
one near Ras Tanura, to be on the islands, asked a yearly rental of £5,000 o-old
for each and suggested that His Majesty’s Government should bear as welf all
expenditure on buildings, upkeep, police and other officials, &c. These were the
most important conditions of a wholly unacceptable counter-proposal. It was
decided to await a favourable opportunity of renewing the proposals put forward
in December 1932, discretion being allowed to the Legation to offer a maximum
rental of £3,000 for all facilities desired. It was recognised that it might be
long before such an opportunity occurred and that, as it was imperative to
maintain the Arabian air route both for civil and military purposes, accidental
violations of Saudi territory were bound to occur. It was decided to meet any
complaints to which such violations might give rise by offering such excuses
as might be possible and appealing to the ordinary principles of humanity and
civilised practice. It was agreed with the Air Ministry that measures should
be taken to reduce the number of such cases to a minimum and that the Legation
should be informed of them with the smallest possible delay, so as to permit
of apology being made before the Saudi Government could protest. It was not