Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎188v] (377/540)

to attract local support because of their family connexions, for Ibn Rifada was of
the Eilli tribe and his people were important at Wejh, while the Abu Tuqeyqas
had a similar connexion with the country about Dhaba. Had it been possible
to make a rapid dash for these ports or even for Muweyla instead of hanging
round further north, the rebellion might have had more success. As it was, the
furthest points reached on the coast were just east of the southern end of the
Gulf of Aqaba and the furthest reached at all was Jebel Shar, a little inland fro^*--'
the road between Muweyla and Dhaba, where the main force was cut to pieces
on the 30th July.
103. Why was an affair so small in itself, and so ill-organised, of such
tremendous importance to Ibn Sand? The general reasons are given in para
graph 7 above. The King could take no risks. The number of the Ikhwan
concentrated at A1 Ula is unknown. It was anything from 4,000 to 10,000, of
whom only a portion went to the front. Forces were also sent from Taif, Mecca
and Jedda, and the Hejazi navy, consisting of one armed dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. , proceeded up the
coast. Large numbers of Ikhwan, some thousands strong, assembled at Taif also,
to be available in the event of trouble elsewhere. The King was prepared for
every contingency. When he had smashed Ibn Rifada, he enforced the lesson to
his enemies by ordering the extermination of all surviving rebels and all who had
helped them.
104. None of the other elements that might have risen moved in the summer.
The Amir of Taima was disaffected and was in communication with the Amir
Abdullah, but he was more frightened of attack by the Ikhwan than disposed to
go into open revolt. The King had also to reckon, however, with the possibility
of political disaffection in places like Jedda and Mecca. He had been displeased
with the Hejazi notables in 1931. He had conceived a fear of their political
tendencies and a dislike of their corruption. In 1932, even before Ibn Rifada’s
incursion, he had shown his displeasure by trenchant utterances, notably by a
speech addressed to the leading men of the two towns before leaving for Taif on
the 22nd May. A note of menace pervaded the pious exhortations to which he
is addicted His military preparations to deal with Ibn Rifada were followed
by arrests in Mecca, including that of the Syrian ex-officer Faudhi Bey-al-
Kawokji, who had been employed as Director-General of Military Organisation,
but had fallen into disgrace in 1931, possibly owing to the suspicion of a connexion
with the Hashimites. On the night of the 28th June a large number of persons
were arrested in Jedda. Some of these were, like Faudhi Bey, deported to Nejd.
It was feared in high circles that the younger townsmen might be infected with
subversive political ideas. For a time the game of football was discouraged, not
because it was a game, but because the clubs might be foci of disloyalty.
105. The defeat of Ibn Rifada relieved all this tension. In the course of the
autumn the deportees were allowed to return, and the playing of football was again
allowed, subject to certain restrictions on clubs. The townsmen were very ready
to declare their loyalty to the victorious King. They tumbled over each other to
sign the petitions in September asking that the unity of the kingdom should be
affirmed by the adoption of the new name of Saudi Arabia. This movement was
said to have originated in meetings at the Taif residence of Sheikh Abdullah-al-
Fadhl, the vice-president of the Legislative Council. The list of signatories of
the first petition was significantly headed by the name of Fuad Bey Hamza, who
is, first and last, an Arab Nationalist. Among the other petitions, of which over
700 were said to have been sent to Riyadh, were many from all classes of
townsmen, leading citizens and guilds of craftsmen, as well as those from Hejazi
tribes and from Nejdis. The movement was represented as being the direct
outcome of the stimulation of national consciousness and loyalty by recent events.
What could the King do but defer to the wishes of "a unanimous people,
unanimous in appearance, although the information published about the Nejdi
petitions was scanty and there was no mention of petitions from Asir? The
decree was issued on the 18th September and the date for the adoption of the
new name was fixed for the 22nd September.
106. Except that the public treasury was bankrupt, all seemed to be well
with Ibn Saud. Trouble was brewing, however, in Asir. The King had sent
thither a new Governor-General earlier in the year, one Fahd-bin-Zuair. He sent
a posse of officials in June to reorganise the Administration; among other things