Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎203v] (407/540)

between them and Iraq, notably that of the hospitality said to be shown to
“remnant chiefs” of the Nejdi rebellion of 1929. His Majesty s Government
made some enquiries in that connexion, but were in general very reluctant to be
drawn into questions which should henceforward be the subject of direct
negotiation between the two Governments concerned.
(2) Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan .
14. It will be seen later that raiding on the frontier between Hejaz-Nejd
and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan was reduced during 1931 to quite small and manageable
proportions. Not so the interminable controversies to which the situation gives
rise between Ibn Saud and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom,
who have to bear the brunt of them in the continued absence of direct relations
or even mutual recognition between the Governments of bransjordan and
Hejaz-Nejd. Both sides were equally exasperated at the end of 1930. His
Majesty’s Government had received no real reply to the British memorandum
communicated on the 25th October of that year to the Hejazi Minister for
Foreign Affairs. The latter had raised certain points with which His Majesty’s
Minister w r as instructed to deal orally on his return to Jedda in December.
Fie found the Hejazi Department for Foreign Affairs in process of reorganisation,
but any chance of this bearing fruit was destroyed by the illness of Fuad Bey
Hamza, which culminated in his departure on leave on the 30th January. It was
not until the 3rd February that Sir A. Ryan w T as able to discuss the question with
Sheikh Yussuf Yasin, who had been made Acting Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. He then went over the whole of the recent ground. He
reproached the Hejazi Government with their failure to reply seriously to the
British memorandum of October; disposed of the petulant complaint in their
interim reply that His Majesty’s Government placed more reliance on the reports
of Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Iraqi officials than they did on information vouched for by
the Hejazi Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and strongly deprecated the practical
condonation of Nejdi raids in another note from Fuad Bey Hamza.
Sheikh Yussuf’s reaction was unexpectedly favourable. He made play, indeed,
with the argument that His Majesty’s Government were responsible for
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , and that their interposition between the parties served as a
protection to Transjordanian raiders, and he manifested openly the hostility of
his Government towards Captain Glubb, the officer who had recently been placed
in charge of the arrangements to cope with the situation on the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
side. Nevertheless, he stated that the Hejazi Government were preparing a
statement of the measures they were themselves taking; that the King w r as taking
active steps to bring article 3 of the Hadda Agreement into operation; that
Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Zeid, the former Hejazi agent at the MacDonnell
investigation, had been appointed Inspector of Bedouin in the frontier area; and
that the notorious Governor of Jauf, En-Neshmi, had been removed from his
post. He asked for suggestions as to the best means of providing for the
inter-communication contemplated in article 3 of the Hadda Agreement.
15. Before this fairly satisfactory communication was reported home, the
indignation of His Majesty’s Government had been raised to boiling point by a
report from Captain Glubb, which dealt mainly with the shamelessness and
deplorable consequences of the raids of which the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan Howeitat tribe
had been the victims in the autumn of 1930. It was decided to make the strongest
possible representations to Ibn Saud, and the decision was adhered to, notwith
standing the more favourable turn which the negotiations in Jedda had taken.
The upshot of an exchange of views between the Foreign Office and His Majesty’s
Minister was that a proposal to accuse Ibn Saud roundly of personal complicity
in raiding was dropped, but every other point was developed with the utmost
severity in a memorandum which Sir A. Ryan sent to the King on the
28th February, and in following up which he was to use all the force at his
command in order to impress on His Majesty the gravity of the situation. The
aspersions cast upon Captain Glubb were strongly repudiated in a separate note
addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs earlier in the day, on the 28th
February. The main memorandum was given something of the character of an
ultimatum by a request for a reply as soon as possible, meaning, it was explained
less officially, within four days at latest. His Majesty’s Government propounded