Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎205r] (410/540)

seize loot from tribesmen found with it in their territories pending a liquidation
of claims.
(b) The main meeting to deal with raids subsequent to the 1st August, 1930,
began on the 15th August. The two representatives again discussed rather a
wider range of subjects than had been defined in the diplomatic correspondence;
but they again achieved little except that they broke the period under review
into two parts, viz., the 1st August, 1930, to the 18th January, 1931, and the
19th January, 1931, onwards. Arrangements were apparently made for the
restitution of such little loot as had been taken since the latter date, but Ibn Zeid
professed to be without adequate material to discuss the much more important
raids that had taken place in the earlier period, although he was understood
to have had full instructions and Fuad Bey subsequently assured His Majesty’s
Charge d’Affaires in Jedda that Ibn Zeid had in fact been supplied in good
time with a complete list of claims. In reporting on the proceedings of the
15th August, Captain Glubb expressed pessimistic views as to the possibility of
arriving at a settlement of the outstanding claims by means of further meetings
on the frontier. He went on leave shortly after and for one reason or another
there was no resumption of the “ main meeting ” up to the end of the year.
(c) Meanwhile, an attempt had been made to meet Ibn Saud on the question
of raiding criminals” by means of a carefully devised formula, which in the
final form proposed by His Majesty’s Government in May took the following
shape:—
“Hejazi or Nejdi nationals, who have taken part in raids in Trans
jordan territory and have returned to Hejaz-Nejd, and who attempt to escape
from penalties imposed on them for raiding by fleeing into Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan ,
will, if possible, be prevented, upon direct notification of their names and
other available particulars by the Hejaz-Nejd frontier authorities to the
corresponding Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan authorities, from crossing the frontier into
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan . If they enter Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan authorities will,
on receiving the necessary information from the Hejaz-Nejd authorities, use
their best endeavours to prevent them from remaining in Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and,
if possible, to expel them into Hejaz-Nejd.
“This undertaking is given on the understanding that the authorities
in Hejaz-Nejd will deal in the same manner with Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan raiding
criminals in similar circumstances. This undertaking may be terminated
either by the Hejaz-Nejd Government or by the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan Government on
two months’ notice, and shall thereafter apply only to those raiding criminals
who have crossed the frontier before its termination.”
19. The negotiations on this formula, at first promising, broke down
completely; and more than anything else on the words “if possible,” to which
Ibn Saud demurred and which His Majesty’s Government were unwilling to
define. The difficulty was only aggravated by a well-meant attempt on the part
of His Majesty’s Minister to explain them in language which would satisfy the
Hejazi Government, but which was afterwards found to fall far short of the
liberality with which the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan authorities wished to be able to construe
the innocent-looking phrase. His Majesty’s Government then despaired of the
formula, and took advantage of the fact that the Hejazi Government were not
pressing the matter to explore the alternative possibility of some kind of formal
instrument to be concluded between Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Hejaz-Nejd. This idea had
to be discarded because neither His Majesty’s Government nor the Amir Abdullah
were prepared to be formally the ‘ ‘ party of the other part ’ to an agreement with
Ibn Saud. No solution could he found for this legal difficulty, and, as the
Hejazis still refrained from pressing it, the question of raiding criminals
remained in abeyance till the end of the year.
20. It may be deduced from the foregoing account that, while Ibn Saud had
been driven by the British quasi-ultimatum of the 28th February to make some
show of giving effect to article 3 of the Hadda Agreement, he had no intention of
going further than might be necessary to turn the wrath of His Majesty s Govern
ment into weary toleration of a nuisance. It would, indeed, be impossible foi
him, without abandoning the personal control which is a fundamental condition
of his supremacy, to give full powers to any subordinate like Ibn Zeid. Anyhow,
his Ministry for Foreign Affairs missed no opportunity of trying to get the