File 2182/1913 Pt 9 'Arabia Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎137v] (272/406)

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the effect both of dispelling the atmosphere of distrust prevailing m Shanfian
circles and of enabling us to decide if there were any means by which we
could make Ibn Saud more actively useful.
At the end of the same telegram, while expressing his view that, if more^
military use were to be made of Ibn Saud, ‘‘we must really approach the
subiect seriously and lend him an Indian or Egyptian battery, Sir E. Lm
questioned the value of such an experiment unless it was desired by the
Egyptian authorities, but suggested that m any case a mixed Mission repre
senting the Commander-in-Chief, the High Commissioner and himself should
visit Najd to “ make proposals in accordance with practical possibilities.
In communicating' the news of the proposed Mission to the King of the
Hiiaz the High Commissioner for Egypt “ purposely emphasised the military
character of the Mission and its role of advising Ibn Saud regarding measures
to be taken against the Turks and Ibn Rashid.” _ At the same time while
noting the “ somewhat uncompromising state of mind ” of King Husain and
deprecating any premature attempt to settle the larger political questions at
issue between him and Ibn Saud he expressed the hope that time and the
successful completion of the Mission, resulting, it is hoped, in active aggres
sion against the enemy on the part of Ibn Saud, would prove to the King the
folly of his present policy of suspicion and the wisdom of effecting a reconcilia
tion with his nearest powerful neighbour.”
Finally, following upon exhaustive verbal discussions of the Arabian
situation in relation to the proposed work of the Mission, Sir P. Cox summed
up his instructions to me in a written memorandum, dated the 31st October,
1917, the gist of which is briefly as follows, namely: —
1. “ The primary and principal object ” of the Mission is to discuss
fully with Ibn Saud and form an opinion as to whether any,
and, if so, what further action Ibn Saud can usefully take to
further the common cause against the enemy;
2. “To endeavour to clear the atmosphere pervading Ibn Sand’s
relations w T ith the Sharif and the Shaikh of Kuwait ” ;
3. “‘To find a permanent or temporary solution of the Ajman
question ” ;
4. “ To discuss with Ibn Saud his recent application for permission to
issue a copper coinage for Najd ” ; and
5. “To discuss the question of the permanent appointment of a British
Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. for Najd.
In addition to the above matters Sir P. Cox asked me to discuss such
matters as the restriction of trade owing to the exigencies of the war; the
impossibility of granting shipping facilities for the Hasa ports during the war;
and the restriction of pilgrim traffic.
Such were the letter and spirit of the instructions under which the Mis
sion sailed to its task. For my part I never lost sight of the fact that its
primary and principal object was to further the common cause against the
enemy by successful action against Ibn Rashid.
5. Itinerary of the Mission.
Leaving Baghdad on the afternoon of the 29th October, 1917, the Mission
proceeded by launch to Basrah, where it arrived at midnight of the 2nd Novem
ber, 1917. Eight days were spent at Basrah collecting supplies and equip
ment, and during this period I took advantage of the presence at Zubair of a
number of chiefs of the neighbouring desert tribes to make myself acquainted
with their affairs in a series of personal interviews with them.
By the morning of the 11th November, all was ready for a start and the
Mission embarked on H.M.S. Lawrence, which had been placed at its disposal
by the courtesy of Rear Admiral C. St. Wake, C.B., commanding the Naval
Forces in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and Mesopotamia.
On the 13th November, we arrived at Bahrain, where we found that the
Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Captain P. G. Loch, I.A., had kindly made arrangements for
the further progress of the Mission to Uqair by dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. .
At 9 a.m. on the following morning the Mission embarked on a dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean.
flying the flag of Ibn Saud and, Captain Crozier of H.M.S. Lawrence having
very kindly placed his steam cutter at our disposal to tow us some part of the
way as there was no wind, we made good progress to the mouth of the Straits
of Bahrain.
The journey from Bahrain to IJqair normally takes seven or eight hours
by dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. but, after parting company with the steam cutter, we drifted becalm
ed for the rest of that day and the next day’s sun was setting as we eventually
drew alongside the pier at Uqair on the 15th November, 1917.
From Uqair, where we were received on behalf of Ibn Saud by the local
Amir, Abdul Rahman ibn Khairulla, we proceeded to Hasa, reaching Hufuf
on the 19th November. Hospitably entertained here on behalf of Ibn Saud
by Abdulla ibn Jiluwi, the Governor of Hasa, w^e left Hufuf on the 22nd
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