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File 2182/1913 Pt 9 'Arabia Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎140r] (277/406)

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The record is made up of 1 item (203 folios). It was created in 27 Dec 1918-2 Jun 1919. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers.


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o&ensive, decided to remove himself from the danger zone without delav TTi«
ottence is unpardonable and exemplifies the futility of putting any trusf'infhe
Shainrnar, whose tribal solidarity is notorious everywdiere in Arabia
. t 5 )n , wlla * 1 sr r llds Poli * ic , aI A » ent at Kuwait reported that X was out
of touch Dhan I do not know and why, coniine hp 'fL ,
anything to shew that he came by my permission, he was permitted to settle-
aadmit ^ d t0 tke , markets of Zubair and Kuwait I cannot under-
stand. Be that as it may, having forfeited my confidence bv -m nol of
treachery he found no difficulty in establishing himself in the confidence of
the authorities at Basrah and from that time onwards, safelv based on Safwan
he proceeded m conjunction with the Aiman, similarlv ii-ispd k i ’
under British protection and thus immune to direct attack bv Tbn 9 a , lbda
make himself a nuisance to the people of Najd? hTbrother SatL ^
becoming prominent as the leader of several Shammailjman “ids into
Saud s territories during the months that followed. b
My representations in the matter failed to effect any reconsiders firm nf
3 O 000 to P B, S 1 nnn* resulted in the reduction » £ Dtari’s klary from
f E 1 1° 0 ?- Per me ! lsem ’ som e months later he had the impudence
ite to me protesting against the reduction of his allowance and reouest
mg me to intervene. He received no reolv TbK request-
is now of academic-importance, buriTJe conslde“d ft
opinion 1 “n°Naid et n a t 1 m / leW tlie ,'’« r 3’ unfavourable effect it had on public
p ion m A ajd at a time when false rumours, sedulouslv fabricsterl at
kS 1 *’ c , reatln ff d °uby as to the ultimate issue of the war It was
reely said that we were afraid of taking strong action against ootential
enemies and ready to. placate them at all cSsts. Tie mo?al was obvious Ibn
criticised°and dlapproved*; 11 ranCe ° f affr0ntS aDd eTen assaults was f kely
estinMX people ^of maf^ ^n tSsJikSl t
“ ll ltar y eousiderations, but that m itself was a confession of weakness da/
gerous to make before an ignorant and generally hostile people.
and his words r were endoSTy the" W^hhaM^
prepared toMp otselve e s y ” WOUld bUt ca “ ot - in ™ should be
/ 1 Other Shammar Elements .
with I Said e al la SaHh C a t l's',,L haVe i, d a alt ,, in . d 5 tail with Uhari ibn Taw ala, who,
witn sauu at balih al bubhan, had collected a considerable o-atherino- ,,r m,,,,,.
mar elements m the neighbourhood of Zubair and sZaf whe^thev con'
carious suppifjo^tlmirTl/ 0 I l’\ S,rad and “ a11 P^babilitv a source o^ pre-'
a ious supply to their fellow tribesmen at and around Hail NeverliipW
from the point of view of Ibn Sand’s contemplated ofienLe a“ainst Hail tbl,’
Ba U sh r id! Sed a conslderable number of possible adherents to the cause of Ibn
T 1 < ] tller j bammar elements, e.g., the Abda and Tuman sections with whom
Lrch “f d ;f Ct dea l m ^: oocu P ied a similar position ?n the Euphrl ean
Thnl^ ln ? me diate and obvious advantages of neutralising
strict lim-t / S Abda T foll oyn? b y allowing them access tS our nmrkets on f
stnctly limited scale, I urged him to strike while they were far awav honinw
of “tL^openingrf^Xnri™. • 6 able t0 reStrict * heir ia £ba "vent
Dahana Ptmg lnS '° tter o£ an as y lum ln the desert between Kuwait and tile
Altogether during the last few months of the period under report the
Shammar situation remained obscure and complicated, and it was never possi
ble to form an estimate of the numbers of tribesmen likelv to flock to the
nfatotalned Hai1 “ ^ eV6nt ° f Ibn Saud,s offensiv e being opened and
In the altered circumstances it is idle now to speculate as to what might
i?y e .'PP e ff ed a Jl we can^ say for certain is that, when Ibn Sand eventually
id strike his first blow against Ibn Rashid, he found the field empty of hostile
e ements and that the further prosecution of the campaign had become un
necessary before it could be knoVn what reply the Shammar elements on the
orders oi Iraq would make to Ibn Rashid’s general call to arms for the defence’
of the tribal stronghold.

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Part 9 primarily concerns the dispute between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hejaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz], and British policy towards both. The item includes the following:

  • a note by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. 's Political Department, entitled 'Arabia: The Nejd-Hejaz Feud', which laments the fact that relations between Bin Saud and King Hussein have to some extent been reflected in the views of the two administrations with which they have respectively been brought into contact (i.e. the sphere of Mesopotamia and the Government of India in Bin Saud's case, and the Cairo administration in King Hussein's case);
  • reports on the presence of Akhwan [Ikhwan] forces in Khurma and debate as to which ruler has the stronger claim to it;
  • attempts by the British to ascertain whether or not a treaty exists between King Hussein and Bin Saud;
  • a copy of a report by Harry St John Bridger Philby entitled 'Report on Najd Mission 1917-1918', which includes as appendices a précis of British relations with Bin Saud and a copy of the 1915 treaty between Bin Saud and the British government;
  • reports of alleged correspondence between Bin Saud and Fakhri Pasha, Commander of the Turkish [Ottoman] forces at Medina;
  • reports of the surrender of Medina by Ottoman forces;
  • discussion as to whether Britain should intervene further in the dispute between Bin Saud and King Hussein;
  • details of the proposals discussed at an inter-departmental conference on Middle Eastern affairs, which was held at Cairo in February 1919;
  • reports that King Hussein's son Abdulla [ʿAbdullāh bin al-Ḥusayn] and his forces have been attacked at Tarabah [Turabah] by Akhwan forces and driven out.

The principal correspondents are the following:

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1 item (203 folios)
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English in Latin script
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File 2182/1913 Pt 9 'Arabia Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎140r] (277/406), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/390/1, in Qatar Digital Library <> [accessed 29 March 2020]

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