File 2182/1913 Pt 9 'Arabia Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎147r] (291/406)

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allotment I calculated on the basis of a minimum force of 10 000 men con
tinuously in the field, at an all round rate of £5 per man’per month to
(1) Family allotments, without which the Arab will not take the field;
(2) The pay of the troops; and^
(3) The cost of provisions, etc.
1 tll „ us arrive d at a fairly clear idea of what was really requisite in
the matter of armament and funds for the proposed campaign, and it only
remained to extract from Ibn Saud a definite undertaking that he would
undertake hostilities if provision were made on the scale Indicated This
rs^edhimlh^liT 00 " 81 ^' 1 ^^ 1 ^' ^ Saud ’ s owrexp^taW, but I
assured him that it would be idle to make more ambitious proposals in view
hn P.IpsW ° f th 1 e Shari / ,s operations and of P our P own oftensfvT
m Palestine, while I impressed upon him that vacillation on his part at that
juncture might result m his getting nothing. P
Suffice it to say that Ibn Saud, after” the fullest consideration of the
matter, finally agreed to undertake active operations, if his resources were
increased on the scale, which we had worked out, and I was then in a nositirm
follow^namely^—° SalS ^ ^ consideration of Sir P - Cox. They were as
(1) that Ibn Saud should be supplied with two siege guns and two field
guns with a sufficient amount of ammunition and such personnel,
preferably Arab prisoners of war, as might be available;
(2) that he should be supplied with 10,000 modern rifles with corres
ponding ammunition; and
(3) that he should be given an initial grant of £20,000 for the purchase
of transport animals and a monthly grant of £50,000 for three
wouldlast 16 whlch ’ 1 estimated, the actual campaign
tw +i? n k my i arrP ^ a !$£ Jidda I found the military situation materially altered
^ile'the'wT n f rr Pur V S V° rCeS at Gaza and the ca P ture of Jerusalem,
oi t 11 political situation was complicated by the jealousy of the
anf, who, anxious lest we should be the means of strengthening his rival
vas doing his best to discredit Ibn Saud in the eyes of the British Government
HaB ° PreVent the reallzatlon of the Mission’s plans for an offensive against
.oernid^tVllT was . Sp ® nt , ^ discussion between the various authorities con-
C TT e d ed ’r h le 1 re “ aiaed at Cairo ’ x t was indisputable that the offensive against
Hail which was m the forefront of the Mission’s programme in November
had been rendered of less importance by the events in Palestine; moreover it
was questioned whether the development of such an offensive would not result
m an irreparable breach between Ibn Saud and the Sharif, in view of the
eHmSon 1 STbn tt p tU b e A°V h +i? atter j My q enerall F was tha t, while the
elimination of Ibn Rashid by the capture of Hail was perhaps not an urgent
CTinffUie Turkish n W V d haT ti? iS w I??i mil ?. tar y advantages in further wlak-
enmg the lurlash position on the Hijaz railway, and might develon into a
tiSe’Xutrl’ m 0 V r ent SPi"?* t, ; e Syrian fro “ tiar - if the ailuS at any
uZistal n l de ^ and an - eff ° rt ; n , th . at direction. Moreover, in vfew of the
•swff ld ll Q d ^ r0 T mg “compatibility of the ambitions of the
S larif and Ibn Saud, I was sensible of the urgent necessity of finding active
employment to distract the latter’s mind from the Sharifian situation. 0
risinrTn^^ C T miSSi ° Ile + r - WaS 1 -f t 1 Uated by tlle fear of a P° ssib le Wahhabi
n & to depiecate any action likely to strengthen Ibn Saud and H.M.’s
Government were inclined towards the same view. Accordinodv after full dis
iCsa^dmTt deClde ^ that ’ * b f n " neither ne cessa,ry no/deffirabTe to give
Cox s u 1 r] Jp d Al J nw S ^ S f ta n C ?l 011 t ?- e SCale P r0 P. 0 s e d by the Mission, Sir Percy
box should be allowed full discretion to sanction the grant of doles such as
miiitnV^t t0 f - keep fbu Saud in play, pending further developments of the
military situation, and it was added that Sir Percy Cox would realise the
importance of not allowing Ibn Saud or others to suspect that H.M’s Govern
ment had grown lukewarm m its hostility to Ibn Rashid.
in th^HHifnf^ 10 ^ mad f by P - C ° X for the “consideration of this decision
nWGt 1 gbt a f nr- th ^ “formation were met by a re-affirmation of the orders
not be^Kift t HlS s , Go T v ernment expressing the view that it should
him in olW Clear t0 Ibn Saud tbat ’ while desirous of supporting
with him i 7 1 i?ndprl b h- WayS ’-iT Wer6 not .Wst then in a position to co-operate
with him m undertaking military operations of an extensive nature.
task that 1 Vie ^ ed ? ome distaste and no little apprehension the
Thmio-h Vl' f Up0n me explaining matters to Ibn Saud in the above sense,
there was !f e +r aS n ° W real mi !^ ary necessity of eliminating Ibn Rashid.
Ibn R^htrf* t ¥., same j™ 6 n° military objection to the capture of Hail by
turned y as difficult to resist the conclusion that the scale had beeh
Thm thf f ! 16 att6 ^ b 7.considerations connected with the Sharifian situa
tion—the tear, to my mind imaginary, of a militant Wahhabi revival and the