File 2182/1913 Pt 9 'Arabia Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎150r] (297/406)

prmo facie to present precisely similar difficulties. Ibn Eashid, for all the
efiorts of the Sharif and his sons to placate him during the last few months
I regard as more likely to join Ibn Sand for mutual protection aoainst the
ambitions of the Sharif than to accept the latter’s overlordship; Maskat
Bahrain and the States of the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. are little likely of their own
volition to merge their independence m an United Arabia; the Idrisi and the
Imam have nothing to gain by adherence to the Sharif ;_to go further afield
there is, as far as my personal experience goes, little ground for supposing
by^orce amfwith ^SScZ^. t0 Sharifi “ ^lordshipZce”!
nature and contain no germ oft cotsStTvttZct^/Z 1 ontytay tltfth 6
interests of the various Arab States, which goto the composSon oTthc ISb
world, are as diverse as those of the various provinces and divisions of India
and are as incapable as they of being welded into a homogeneous uolitilaT
entity, except under the influence of a strong foreign domination capable
fnterTsls. PUbllC P<!aCe beWeen sects and livers;
Arabian unity as an ideal, in the broadest sense of the term is doomed
to perish of inanition; our prestige and influence in Central Arabia have
Si U d lif e e rl0 T’cnu°s 118h n0t lrreT ° c , able : diminution through our attempts to
give it me. I can see no reasonable solution of the problem before us short
of the recognition of such Arab States, as we find to be in enioym’ent of
able ^nd ^^^ \ Can 9 011c . eive no role in the future, more honour-
a f d sat . ls ^ m ^ to British aspirations, than that of controlling the desti
nies of the independent States of Arabia under a loose political he-emonv
responsible—if we except the moral responsibility to ourselves and the states
themselves to develop their resources—only to\localise conflicts and keep'the
peace, where the interests of the majority are jeopardised. P
frvwv Ma J es J t y’ s Government have,.during the past few years, grown accus-
omed to regard the Sharif as the strongest power in Arabia and have, perhaps.
SW-f’ 11 " u f co J lsc l^ s modesty, tended to minimise the part plaved^n the
Shanf s actual military operations by the forces and resources to siv noth in o-
of the services of the British Officers, placed at his dispZ ’it is Lfthere?
fore entirely unnecessary to call attention to the growing power of Naid
based on the unifying influence of a stern fanatical creed and consolidated’
after years of patient work, by a monarch, who fills to-day in Arab estimation
the place occupied but yesterday by Muhammad Ibn Rashid. It is at any
rZlhSfruZgTh P e a s fyt r tof i h a e , reco8nition ° f tbe
14. The Wahhabi Revival.
. Colonel Hamilton on his journey to Riyadh in October, 1917, had occa
sion to pass within a day s journey of Artawiya, one of the centres of t\ie new
Wahhabi movement associated with the name of the Akhwan brotherhood
He was impressed with what he he'ard regarding the tenets of this fanatical
sect and, without enquiry, accepted as probably correct a local estimate, which
gave the town a population of 35,000 souls. A little reflection would I am
CO vr mC A d ’ i\ ave , deterr . ed Colonel Hamilton from reporting what he had heard
without further investigation, and it is not improbable that he did not expect
his report to be taken seriously. In the first place it was prirna facie improb
able that a town, twice as big as the biggest town in Central Arabia, could have-
sprung up m the space of a few years; in the second place—and this point is to-
my mmd conclusive—native estimates of population are notoriously unreliable.
Doughty s plan of reducing all such estimates by 90 per cent, might have been
of/p 117 m thl f- £ aS -f;, 1 - Saw the to . wn ’ from a safe distance, in
October, 1918, and I am satisfied that its population cannot exceed from 10 000
to 1^,U00 souls. ’
Be that as it may, I found, on my arrival at Jidda and Cairo, that
Colonel Hamilton s report had obtained official publicity and a disturbing
amount of credence, causing no little alarm and predisposing the authorities,
m charge of Arab affairs to attach more importance, than was perhaps war
ranted by the facts, to reports emanating from prejudiced sources regarding
the growth and objects of the Wahhabi revival. A report, written by Lieut.-
uolonel 1. L Lawrence and purporting to give the views of Sharif Faisal,
appeared m the Amfe Bulletin (No. 74 of 1917); Sharif Abdulla’s views, in due-
course, received prominence in the same vehicle, and I felt that the issue was
oemg it it had not already been—prejudged on totally insufficient data. I
deprecated the attaching of too much importance to the views of obviously
prejudiced individuals and did my best to discount the serious view that was
Deing taken of the situation in high quarters, but Sharifian circles made the
’ ° S ,?• , i e imaginary menace and represented the WAhhabi revival as
immediately threatening the peace and security of Arabia.