File 2182/1913 Pt 9 'Arabia Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎157v] (312/406)

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these officials to control without the aid of force the actions of the two Amirs.
As for the Hasa, Ibn Sand would fee appointed Mutasarnf °f ^
but the collection of the customs would remain m lurhish hands and lurk
garrisons would be replaced in the ports.
Nothing was more certain than that Ibn Sand’s appearance on the coast
must ultimately bring him into direct contact with ourselves whether we
welcomed it or'sought to avoid it; and this anxiety underlay and possibly
accelerated the action of the Porte. But at the moment Turkish fears were
groundless. We were concerned wholly with the conclusion of prolonged
negotiations with Constantinople touching interests in Mesopotamia and the
Gulf which were of vital importance, and were less inclined, it possible, tiian
before for Arabian adventure. We made a friendly offer of mediation whic
was refused, and when, in April, 1914, the Amir met the Lntish Agent,
Colonel Grey, outside Kuwait, he was given to understand that we had re
cently concluded a comprehensive agreement with Turkey and could hold out
to him no hope of support. Ibn Sand was thrown back on his own resources,
but these were considerable, and tlie secret treaty which was signed m May
bv himself and the Wali of Basrah, fell short of TaBat Beg’s anticipations.
He accepted the title of Wali and Military Commandant of Najd which was
offered to himself and his descendants as long as they should remain loyal,
and engaged to fly the Turkish flag, but he was to have charge of the customs,
on behalf of the Ottoman Government, raise his own levies and provide the
garrisons for Qatif and Ojair. Deficiencies in the Kajd budget were to be
met from the customs, and no revenue from, any local income was to be paid
to Constantinople until such time as there was a surplus—an eventuality of
doubtful occurrence. But while exercising in his own territories an authority
which was in all but the name that of an independent ruler, his correspond
ence with foreign Powders was to he conducted solely through the Porte, and
in case of war he was to come to the assistance of the Sultan.
What would Imve been the upshot of a treaty which so imperfectly re
flected the convictions of the contracting parties can scarcely admit of doubt.
The guiding trait of Ibn Sand’s character is what must be called a racial
rather than a national patriotism, but this sentiment was not likely to evoke
sympathetic consideration from the leaders of the Committee of Union and
Progress, who were blindly determined on the Ottomanization of the Arabs.
As a strict Wahhabi, the new Wali of Najd looked with abhorrence on the
loose religious principles of the Turks and was far from admitting their pre
tensions to represent and direct Islam. He had, in conversation with Cap
tain Shakespear, spoken with unexpected vehemence cn this point, saying
that in his eyes the infidel was preferable to the Turk, since the latter broke
the rule he professed to follow, while the former acted in accordance with his
own law, and to the same listener he declared that he had accepted the terms
of the agreement only because he was assured privately that even the small
measure of sovereignty accorded to Turkey would never be claimed. The
Kuwait treaty was put to the test by the outbreak of the European war and
found wanting.
The disquieting attitude adopted by Turkey on the outbreak of war be
tween Germany and the Entente Powers produced a profound alteration in
our policy towards the Porte. It became necessary to reckon up our assets
in Arabia, and early in October Captain Shakespear, who was in England,
was ordered to return to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and get into touch with Ibn Saud
so as to prevent if possible the outbreak of unrest in the interior, and in the
event of war with Turkey to ensure that no assistance should be rendered from
that quarter. Before he could reach his destination wmr had been declared.
A message had been despatched to Ibn Saud informing him of Captain
Shakespear’s impending visit, recognizing his position in Kajd and the Hasa
and guaranteeing him against reprisals by sea or land if he would commit
himself to enter the lists against Turkey. The Turks, on their side, lost no
time in approaching the Amirs of Central Arabia. Their scheme, which was
that Ibn Kashid should aid in the campaign against Egypt while Ibji Saud
opposed the British advance in Mesopotamia, showed that they were'as un
aware of the feeling towards^ them which prevailed among the Arabs as they
were ignorant of the conditions of the desert, where the network of tribal
feud permits no man to withdraw his forces on a distant expedition without
fear of attack on his unprotected possessions. Ibn Saud, apparently in order
to gain time, took advantage of his abiding enmity with Ibn Rashid and
launched into open hostilities against him. In vain Enver Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. urged him to
abandon private quarrels, sent him a gift of money for the expenses of co
operation with the Sultan’s armies, and ultimately entrusted Saiyid Talib
with the task of bringing about a reconciliation. At this juncture Saiyid
Talib was busily engaged in endeavouring through the intermediation of
Shaikh Khaz/al and His Majesty’s Consul at Muhammareh to drive a bargain
with the British Government providing for his adherence to us in the event
of war with Turkey, but the terms which he put forward were so extravagant
as to^be impossible of acceptance, and he was still hesitating over Shaikh
Khaz‘al’s advice to him to abate them when the declaration of wnr left him