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File 2182/1913 Pt 10 'N.W. Frontier: Proposed Russian zoological expedition' [‎257r] (105/664)

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The record is made up of 1 item (330 folios). It was created in 28 May 1919-13 Jan 1920. It was written in English and Arabic. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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Ims^ treaty, therefore, although it was never intended to be exhaustive, is on
sounder lines than our treaty with the Idrisi or our more informal arrangements with
mg Husem, and there ought to be considerably less difficulty in expanding it, when
^±he tune comes, into a definitive treaty settling our relations with Bin Sand in detail.
eie are, however, several positive points affecting British desiderata to which
the present treaty appears to commit us :—
(1 .)—Demarcation of Territories.
In article 1 we recognise Bin Saud as independent ruler of certain enumerated
countries “ and their dependencies and territories, which will be discussed and deter
mined hereafter.”
This is less explicit than our undertaking to the Idrisi (article 6 of Idrisi Treaty,
tor which see Memorandum on British Commitments to the Idrisi), in which we under-
take^ “ at the conclusion of the war to adjudicate between the rival claims of the Idrisi
oaiyid and the Imam Yahya, or any other rival.”
1) . ^ comn )iI s us ty arbitrate on the territorial questions at issue between
Bin baud and King Husein, and in the last resort to impose an effective sanction for
our award.
(2 .)—Keeping of the Peace.
In the original trucial treaties with the Independent Chiefs of u Trucial Oman A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. ,”
His Majestys Governments rights and obligations were strictly limited to the main-
tcnance of peace at sea, and we did not attempt to control the mutual relations on land
of the Arab parties to this series of treaties.
This formula set a very desirable limit to His Majesty’s Government’s liabilities,
while covering most of the causes of strife between the local Arab rulers. The trucial
chiefs of^ Oman hold sway in a narrow strip of territory between the sea and an
uninhabited desert. The activities of their subjects are almost wholly maritime, and
there are no nomadic tribes in their area of jurisdiction to create difficulties of allegiance
and demarcation.
But it is evident that if the British trucial system, hitherto confined to the fringe
between the south and east coasts and the great south-eastern desert, is to be extended,
as it has been extended during the war, to the remainder of the Peninsula, we shall
have to keep the peace between rulers whose prosperity depends, not upon the coasting
trade or the pearl fisheries, but upon the command of inland oases and Bedouin tribes.
. the Idrisi, and King Husein, with whom we have entered into relations
during the war, are rulers of this latter kind. A “ Pax Britannica” in the Persian
Gulf and the Bed Sea, valuable and indeed indispensable as it is, will do comparatively
little to remove the causes of friction between them, or to enable His Majesty’s
Government to deal effectively with such friction when it arises.
. H are to keep the peace between them, we shall be driven eventually to control
their relations with one another by land. To a certain extent this may be done by a
maritime^ btyckacty. But apart from the fact that, where political authority is as lax as
it is m Arabia, it is difficult to blockade one State effectively without blockading the
whole Peninsula,* it is in the nature of things more difficult to bring pressure to bear
on Hail or Er-Biadh by this method than on Sharjah, or even Maskat. Besides this,
our new Arab Allies are considerably more powerful than most of the Arab rulers who
have previously entered into a trucial relationship with us. And in the case of King
Husein, who is likely to be the most troublesome of all over his relations with his
neighbours, it is peculiarly difficult for His Majesty’s Government to exert pressure,
whether by blockade or otherwise, owing to the sanctity of his territory in the eyes of
the Moslem world, and the traffic of pilgrims between his ports and every other Moslem
country.
Ihe keeping of the peace on land thus appears to be the crucial problem in that
extension of the British trucial system over the remainder of the Arabian Peninsula,,
which has been carried a long way towards completion during the war.
The Treaty with Bin Saud is our first experiment in this more highly-developed
and difficult form of trucial relationship, and in their ruling on the Treaty a short time
after its ratification (see above), the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. laid down the important doctrine that
we cannot admit that Article 2 is binding on us as against other Arabs.”
On this ruling, our obligations to Bin Saud by land would be confined to securing
him against aggression on the part of some outside Power {e.g., Turkey, Persia,
* This seems a fair inductiou from our experiences during the war at Koweit.
[939]
E

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Content

The title provided at the beginning of this item does not relate in any way to the item's contents. Part 10 is in fact concerned with the dispute between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hejaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz], and British policy towards both.

The item begins with reports that Bin Saud's Akhwan [Ikhwan] forces have advanced to Tarabah (also spelled Turaba in the correspondence) [Turabah], in Hejaz, and includes details of His Majesty's Government's proposed response, which is to inform Bin Saud that if he does not withdraw his forces from Hejaz and Khurma then the rest of his subsidy will be discontinued and he will lose all advantages secured under the treaty of 1915. Included are the following:

  • copies of translations of correspondence between Bin Saud and King Hussein;
  • discussion as to whether the British should send aeroplanes to assist King Hussein;
  • minutes of inter-departmental meetings between representatives of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Treasury, on the subject of Bin Saud, held at the Foreign Office and chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Earl Curzon of Kedleston [George Nathaniel Curzon];
  • discussion as to how the British should respond in the event of Bin Saud's Wahabi [Wahhabi] forces taking Mecca and advancing on Jeddah, which it is anticipated may result in the evacuation of a large number of Arabs and British Indians;
  • discussion regarding a proposed meeting between Harry St John Bridger Philby and Bin Saud on the Gulf coast;
  • a report by Captain Herbert Garland [Director of the Arab Bureau, Cairo], entitled 'Note on the Khurma Dispute Between King Hussein and Ibn Saud';
  • a document entitled 'Translation of a Memorandum on the Wahabite [sic] Crisis', addressed to the High Commissioner, Egypt, by Emir Feisal [Fayṣal bin Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī], in which Feisal implores the British to take military action against the Wahabi movement;
  • copies of translations of letters addressed to Bin Rashid [Saʿūd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Rashīd], from Bin Saud and King Hussein respectively, which provide the perspectives of both on recent events at Khurma and Tarabah;
  • a memorandum from the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department, entitled 'Memorandum on British Commitments to Bin Saud'.

The item's principal correspondents are the following:

This item also contains translated copies of correspondence between Hussein and the then High Commissioner at Cairo, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon [commonly referred to as the McMahon-Hussein correspondence], dating from July 1915 to January 1916.

Extent and format
1 item (330 folios)
Written in
English and Arabic in Latin and Arabic script
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File 2182/1913 Pt 10 'N.W. Frontier: Proposed Russian zoological expedition' [‎257r] (105/664), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/390/2, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100036528096.0x000077> [accessed 28 March 2024]

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