File 2182/1913 Pt 2 'Persian Gulf Situation in El Katr Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎220r] (441/543)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
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TURKEY.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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Section 5.
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No. 1.
Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)
(No. 193.)
gi rj Constantinople, March 18, 1914.
IN my despatch No. 1021 of the 20th December last I mentioned a rumour that
some leading Arab chiefs contemplated holding a congress at Koweit or elsewhere with
a view to bringing pressure to bear on the Turkish Government, which showed some
signs of uneasiness at the attitude of the Ottoman Arab world. In paragraph 11 of
his summary of events for the three months ending January 1914 the acting British
consul-general at Bagdad reproduces the same rumour, with the added detail that
among those to be represented at the congress were the Grand Sherif of Mecca, Ibn
Sand of Nejd, Ibn Rashid Jebel Shammar, Ajeymi Sheikh of Muntefik, and Seyyid
Talib of Basra. Although Colonel Erskine goes on to state that the projected
conference is unlikely to be held, the report is significant in view of the dissatisfaction
which prevails among Ottoman Arabs generally, and the list of names given is an
indication of the possibility of the great chieftains on the Arab fringe of the Empire
sinking their personal differences in order to enforce nationalist aspirations as against
the Central Government, which is directed by the Committee of Union and Progress,
and which they still regard as pursuing a Turkifying policy. So far there had been
little sign of cohesion, the Grand Sherif having been at open enmity with Ibn^ Sand,
for instance, and Ajeymi having been until recently an avowed enemy of Seyyid Talib s.
The Grand Sherif’s attitude being of special interest in consequence of his recent
application to Lord Kitchener, I enclose a memorandum which I have had prepared
concerning him. As for Ibn Saud, his occupation of El Hassa last year is an eloquent
demonstration both of his power and of his feelings towards the Central Government.
Seyyid Talib’s influence in Basra, the skill which he has displayed m consolidating it,
and the relations which he maintains with Koweit and Nejib are well known to His
Majesty’s Government. If these leaders were to combine either in a constitutional
agitation for devolution or autonomy or in an avowedly Separatist movement they
could undoubtedlv cause much trouble. In this connection I may refer to that part of
my despatch No. 117 of the 24th February last which deals with the wider aspects of
the Aziz Ali case. 1 i p u a
It is still impossible to say what real prospect there may be of any united Arab
movement. That the Central Government is on the alert is perhaps indicated by the
fact that energetic military Valis on whom the committee can rely have been within
the last few months appointed to Bagdad, Basra, and the Hedjaz. Ibn baud has bee
negotiating terms of submission to the Government. The Grand Shen . ,
Abdullah, who is a deputy in the Turkish Parliament, has come on from Egypt to
Constatinople by invitation from them, and according to accounts which I have hea
he appears to be nervous as to what may await him here.
I have thought it prudent to abstain from showing any particular interest m the
Arab question in my conversations with the Grand Vizier and other Ministers m view
of the^uspicions which it might arouse, as the Turkish Government are pro^
of the inclination of the Arabs to look to His Majesty s Government for sympat y_
tteir movement and even for eventual protection if they are
their imienendence I have reported m my despatch No. 11/ of the ^4tn ultimo t e
lan^ua/e which has been held to Arab officers in the Turkish army who have visited
His 0 Majesty's Embassy, and have enquired what would be the attitude of His ajes y «
Government in certain eventualities. As I am disposed to see m the lecent outrages
at Basra, which are principally directed against British subjects an * e P a ^
of the Arabs to force the hand of His Majesty’s Government in the direction ol
intervention, I informed Mr. Crow on the 17th ultimo that I could not recommem t e
despatch of a British man-of-war to the Shatt-el-Arab. e V ;,We of
The need for caution is apparent at the present moment, when there is evidei ce
a concerted movement.on the part of the Arabs. If these projects should mature, and
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