File 4345/1912 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎144v] (293/330)

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(f) that the pan^e of the line passing through British territory and the
British zone be different from that of the lin p in the Russian zone,
and that the break of gauge be at- Bandar Abbas on the liaiit of
the British zone;
(/) that, in return for our co-operation in the main project, Russia
should pledge herself not to entertain or support, without coming
to an understanding with Great Britain, any proposal for a line
in the neighbourhood of the Perso-Afghan border within the
Russian or neutral zones.
3. We concur generally in these conclusions, except in regard to a few
points as to which we find ourselves unable to endorse the recommendations
of the Committee. The first point relates to the proposed internationalisation
of the branch lines. Wh agree that it will be desirable to internationalise
any branch lines that may be constructed in the neutral zone. But we see no
necessity for treating as international any branch lines which Russia or Great
Britain may decide to construct in their respective zones. We would
propose, therefore, to treat the proposed branch line from Bandar Abbas or
Charbar to Kerman as a purely British project and to keep this question out
of the negotiations with Russia, except in so lar as her support may be
necessary to enable us to secure a concession from the Persian Government.
4. Secondly, we do not endorse the proposal for a branch line from
Bushire to Shiraz and Ispahan. Such a line would be a most difficult and
most costly undertaking, and would at tbe same time be quite unnecessary
either as a commercial project or as a bar to German enterprise, since the
construction of a line from Bandar Abbas to Shiraz and Mohammerah would
cause all tbe trade to pass through Bandar Abbas and Mohammerah and
Bushire would entirely lose its importance as a port. Bandar Abbas could,
we believe, be converted into a good port, while Bushire can never be a good
port, since all the big ships have to lie out at a distance of five or six miles from
the shore. Consequently, Busbire must in the end disappear as a trade centre
and a railway to Shiraz would be useless.
Whether Shiraz should be connected with Ispahan or not is another
matter. If the Trans-Persian line passes through Ispahan, as proposed by
the Consortium, a branch to Shiraz would be advantageous from the Russian
point of view, since it would provide railway communication with Shiraz
which Russian trade would not otherwise have. In that case, we think
that it would be desirable to make no mention of a branch from Shiraz to
Ispahan at present. If, on the other hand, the Trans-Persian line is to avoid
Ispahan, as proposed by the Russian Government, it would be greatly to our
advantage to have a connection with Ispahan, since our trade would be able to
pour in from Bandar Abbas via Shiraz. We think, therefore, that it would
be better to take no action in regard to this branch line until it is known moro
certainly whether the Trans-Persian line is to pass through Ispahan or not.
5. Thirdly, we disagree with the Committee as to the necessity for pro
ceeding with the construction of the Mohammerah-Hamadan line simul
taneously with the construction of the main line. Such a branch would be
useless for practical purposes, since it would have to compete with the
Baghdad-Khanikin line and the Trans-Persian Railway. A line from Julfa
to Mohammerah would have been useful as a counterpoise to the Baghdad
Railway in the absence of the more comprehensive scheme now proposed, but
it has quite lost its value now that the Trans-Persian Railway is to be the
counterpoise. We think, therefore, that the Mohammerah-Hamadan concession
should be obtained merely for the purpose of ear-marking, as against any
attempt to connect the Baghdad Railway extension with the Gulf by this route.
6. Finally, we are not persuaded, on the information contained in the
Committee’s report, that the practical difficulties of the alignment proposed by
r Colonel Cox (namely, from Yezd to Karachi via Kerman, Bam, Regan, Bampur,
Sarbaz and Kej) are so serious as to make it necessary to adopt the more
circuitous route rid Bandar Abbas, and we have some doubt whether the latter
route would prove acceptable to the Russian Government. We would preiel