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File 4345/1912 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎150r] (304/330)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (163 folios). It was created in 1911-1913. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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5
with Russia, the question hardly needs reply. We must, however, consider also
the possible future contingency of hostility with Russia. A railway line lead
ing from an enemy’s country, distant though that may be, undoubtedly intro
duces sources of danger to which we are unaccustomed. As indicated in the
previous remarks, the extent of the danger largely depends on the previous
effect of the line on the autonomy of Persia.
The proposed line moreover introduces a new factor into the problem; for
Germany will have doubtless acquired access to this same line from Baghdad.
It is possible to conceive conditions under which the new element might add
an additional source of danger to ourselves from the new line, but it is, I think,
more reasonable to suppose that it will greatly minimise future danger, because
the antagonism of German and Turkish interests with those of Russia is likely
both to avert hostility between Russia and ourselves, and, in the event of
hostilities, to render the Persian line of less assistance and value to Russia than
it might otherwise be. In the event of a combination of Russia, Germany,
and Turkey against us, it would be hard to overestimate the menace which the
Persian line presents to us, but at this stage it would seem superfluous to com
plicate the problems of the proposed line with those of Armageddon, and it
should suffice to continue to deal with this question on more familiar lines.
14. It may be assumed that we will have constructed at least one branch
line from the Persian coast to meet the central line and this fact, in conjunc
tion with the long length of the line from Baku or Enzeli, will deprive it
of many attractions to Russia for military purposes against India. Again, and
this is a still more important factor, the same line nearer India will have
converted an important strategic point from being a grave source of danger into
a place of great advantage to ourselves. I refer to Seistan.
As long as Seistan is left as it is now, equi-distant from the nearest
Russian and British garrisons, it must ever remain an attractive objective
and a source of temptation to Russia, and a danger to ourselves. The con
struction of the proposed railway line will bring us within such easy reach of
it as to destroy all Russian hopes of its easy acquisition. Being no longer in
the line of least resistance, it will lose its attractions to Russia and its danger
to ourselves.
On the other hand, Seistan, with its important strategic position with regard
to Persia and the Helmand, would be at our disposal, and its great local resouices*
would enable us to place there, when necessity arises, a force sufficiently large
to render access to India by rail both difficult and dangerous.
Prom a military-political point of view therefore, the proposed railway line
does not seem an unmixed evil or one which should be avoided on military
grounds at the expense of other important considerations.
15. Afghanistan has so far been omitted from these remarks, but a word
is necessary on tne Afghan aspect of the question. The line will affect
Afghanistan only from the military aspect and in proportion to the menace
it represents to that country from Russia. We cannot expect Afghanistan to
be pleased with railway or any other arrangements we may jointly make
with Russia, as suspicion of Russia must tend to give them a significance
hostile to Afghanistan. Apart from this, there is but little in the proposed
project which will alarm the Afghan Government. The desirability of our
improving- communications in order to co-operate in the defence of Western
Afghanistan has already been clearly recognised by them. The position of the
proposed line with regard to Seistan and thereby to the Herat-Kandahar route
will, I consider, outweigh in the official Afghan mind any additional menace
from Russia through Southern Persia.
16 Of the numerous minor difficulties which the present proposal will
brino- to the front, the one which will probably give most trouble is that
of guao-e Assuming that neither Russia nor ourselves will allow the other to
use their standard guage, it follows that some neutral guage will have to be
decided upon This involves a break of guage at both ends of the Persian line,
and incidentally increases the difficulty of finding a suitable place for the entry
of the line into British territory.
The requirements of a large Railway terminus, establishment, staff,
&c., in supplies and water are not easily met on the Indo-Persian border,

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Content

This volume comprises telegrams, despatches, correspondence, memoranda, notes, printed reports, a press cutting and a map, relating to the connection of the railway system of Europe to the railway system of India by the construction of railway lines through Persia.

The discussion in the volume relates to the proposal of a Russian consortium and the response of the Government of India to this proposal. A Report (No. 18 of 1911' folios 144 - 160) notes that the Government of India would do well to accept in principle the Russian proposal subject to a number of modifications. A map entitled 'Indexed Map Showing Proposed Railways in Persia' (folio 160) accompanies the report. Suggested modifications included:

  • the point of intersection of the trans-Persian railway with the Indian railway system (British preference for Karachi); and concessions for branch lines (Bandar Abbas, Charbar, Mohammerah);
  • the requirement that both main and branch lines in Persian territory be deemed international with Russia and Britain holding preponderant shares and Persia included as a participant;
  • and the use of a different gauge railway in the British and Russian zones. As a quid pro quo for their support on this matter Britain expected the Russians to cease any consideration of extending the Trans-Caspian Railway to the Persia-Afghan border.

Also discussed are the negotiations about a loan between the Société des Études du Chemin de Fer Transpersan and the Persian Government and a suggestion that the British and French governments should guarantee a substantial loan by securing it against the crown jewels.

The following topics are also discussed: the Foreign Office proposal to refer the whole question of railway development in Persia to the Committee of Imperial Defence; a draft application for the concession; a memorandum by Brigadier General A H Gordon; dispatch of instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at St Petersberg on the attitude of the Her Majesty's Government; the view of the Sir G Buchanan on the attitude of the Russian Government to the question of alignment.

The principal correspondents in the volume include: His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, the Earl of Crewe; Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, E H S Clark; His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey; the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Zachariah Cox; the President of the Railway Board; Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan.

This volume includes a divider which gives the subject and part numbers, year the subject file was opened, subject heading, and list of correspondence references contained in that part by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence.

Extent and format
1 volume (163 folios)
Arrangement

The papers are arranged in approximate chronological order from the rear to the front of the volume. The subject 4345 (Trans-Persian Railway) consists of 1 volume.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the inside front cover with 1, and terminates at the inside back cover with 163; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio.

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English in Latin script
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File 4345/1912 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎150r] (304/330), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/307, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100036625671.0x000069> [accessed 28 March 2024]

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