File 4345/1912 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎151v] (307/330)

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charges for other forms of transport when the commodities to he handled are
of comparatively low specific value or such as do not call for much expedition
in getting them to their market. But^ those obstacles that consist in oM,
brigandage, official and unofficial, in the difficulties related to exchange and
remittance, in the corruption and inefficiency of the Courts, in the conditions
of credit, in the uncertainty as to the identity, the real residence, and the
solvency of one’s buyer, in the long delay that occurs between the placing and
the execution of an order, and in the impracticability of efficient supervision
and control of the agencies in Persia—to say nothing of the general political
conditions that affect other things as well as trade, all these obstacles must
almost certainly persist until a railway opens the country up. In fact it
may be taken that until the country is so opened up the progress of penetration
or assimilation cannot really begin and instability must continue. Under
present conditions we are more or less shut out; but Bussia has been able
to make better progress than we. No doubt the new railway will serve her
better than it will us, but it will serve us too, and on the whole
it would, I think, create a greater likelihood of our getting even with
Russia than can be said to exist at present. Even if it did not better our
position relatively to that of Bussia, is there any likelihood whatever that its
prospect of doing so would be improved by delay ? So far as the “ man in
the street” can see there is no such likelihood—quite the contrary. It is
almost incredible that the more intimate “ commerce,” mercantile and social,
that would attend the creation of a railway could fail to bring about some sort
of assimilation of that part of Persia which is nearest our borders. I should
imagine that from a political point of view this would be worth something
even if the railway did not pay for a good many years. I should not expect it
to pay in the literal sense until the process of assimilation had gone
pretty far. For Indian trade comprises few commodities of such high specific
value as would stand cumulative railway freights of a large amount, and I
imagine that, in respect of these commodities, most shippers to and from
Europe would prefer the greater security of transport by sea over routes that
are well policed. Even in my time, the Constantinople Express was held up
once or twice in Europe when it was believed that it carried much treasure. As
regards trade with Persia it is fairly certain that the risk would be accepted
in respect of precious stones and of specie for settlement of debts; for the
conditions on our side would be a great deal better than those now present. And
it is very probable indeed that the railway would carry northwards substantial
quantities of textiles (silk, wool and cotton), sugar, tea, coffee and sundry
|? manufactures of fairly high specific value. But I hold that even for these
the natural channel would be the Gulf and the railway from the Gulf.
The 31st December 1910.
F. Noel Paton.
Enclosure No. 4.
(Memorandum by the General Staff on the proposed Trans-Persian 'Railway.)
The General Staff are concerned only with the “ probable effect of the
Enclosure No. 5 to Secretary of State’s despatch Scheme * * On the strategic position of th©
No. 32. Indian Empire ”,
In considering this strategic aspect of the proposal the General Staff wish
to emphasize the fact that any material improvement of land communications
towards or through the natural barriers which at present encircle the frontiers of
India must involve a great increase to the military responsibilities of India and
of the Empire. When discussing the strategic problem of a possible approach
of Bussian railways to Afghanistan Mr. Balfour stated : “ if Bussian strategic
railways are allowed to creep closer and closer to the frontier which we are
bound to defend: then this country will inevitably pay for its supineness by
having to keep on foot a much larger army than anything which any of us
can contemplate with equanimity. Foresight and courage can obviate these
dangers, without foresight and courage they may come upon us: and if they
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