File 4345/1912 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎157r] (318/330)

;
Adrsntages and
disadvantages
of railway
connection
between
Europe and
India-
(a) Strategical
and political.
Report of the Committee on the proposed Trans-Persian Railway.
The proposal of the Russian Consortium on which the Secretary of State asks the
opinion of the G-overnment of India, is the construction of a railway Hue from Baku to
Tehran, thence wa Kum, Kashan, Yezd to Kerman, and thence to Nushki via Seistan.*
It is stated that the construction of a railway in Persia is not an object completo
in itself, but simply a means towards the realisation of “ a world route to unite by ons
•ontiuuous line of rails Europe to India and other countries in the Ear East”.
The more immediate object of the promoters appears to be the development of 1 Russian
trade with, Persia, which is now threatened by the Baghdad Railway and the increasing
interest of Germany in the Middle East. It is also remarked incidentally that the line would
«pcure Russians strategic position in Turkey and in Western Trans-Caucasia.
The line is to be constructed as an international• undertaking, the participants being
Russia, Great Britain, France and possibly Persia. The cost of'construction is estimated afe'
£06,950,000 roubles and the possible profits at 15 per cent on the subsciibed capital.
The Government of India are asked for their views on the question of railway connec
tion in general and the particular proposal put forward iu the Rusbian memorandum, and
their advice is specially asked upon the commercial aspects of the project, and its immediate
Local consequences.
£. It may be convenient at the outset to offer a few observations on the general
question of the jsrws and cons of a connection by land between Europe and India by way of a
Trans-Persian Railway.
The question may first be considered from the point of view of the defence of' India
against foreign invasion. By the operation of the Anglo-Russian Convention we are secured
for the present from the fear of a Russian invasion oc India, but in the nature of things
the possibility of hostilities with Russia at some future d de canuot altogether be ignored.
In view of this possibility it is clear that any material improvement of land communications
towards or through the natural barriers which at present encircle the frontiers of India must
involve a great increase to the military responsibilities of India,—responsibilities which are
already inconveniently heavy. From the purely strategical point of view therefore it would
undoubtedly be preferable that India should maintain her ^avi-insular position and should
refuse to co-operate in any scheme which would tend to facilitate the transportation of a
hostile Power up to or across her irontier.
We recognise, however, that the march of events in the Near and Middle East renders it
impossible that this position of isolation can be indefinitely maintained. The advent of the
Baghdad Railway combined with the impotence of Persia must inevitably disturb the status
quo, while the prospect of a Russo-German combination in the event of our refusal to co-operate
in the Russian scheme compels us to reconsider the position from a wider outlook. From this
standpoint it seems to us desirable to seize the opportunity which the present proposal offers
£or securing the conditions which we consider essential rather than to wait until circumstances
may force us to permit the connection on terms which may be less advantageous.
3. With regard to the merits of the enterprise from the commercial point of view, we ^ commercial,
are in general agreement with the opinions expressed in the letter from the Board of Trade to
the Foreign Office of L3th September 1910 and in Mr. Worthington’s memorandum forwarded
^herewith? We do not consider that there is any likelihood of goods being carried on the
tail way from the United Kingdom to India or vice-versa. The cost of transport by sea,
especially to the south of India, will always be cheaper than by rail, and the sea route will
have the further advantage of avoiding the re-handling of the goods at a continental port and
at the points at which breaks of gauge may occur. We are iuclined to doubt also whether
the through passenger traffic on the railway would be of any great magnitude. The volume
of such traffic between the United Kingdom and India is not very large or likely to increase
in any considerable degree, since there is no emigration to India such as is carried on the
trans-Siberian line; and it seems probable that a reduction in farts would enable the steam-ship
companies to retain the bulk of the existing traffic. As regards the local traffic northwards
from India into Persia, no doubt the railway would lead to some development of this trade,
but it is imposs ble to form any estimate as to the amount of such increase in view of the wide
difference between the conditions under which the traffic is now carried on and those which would
be created by the existence of the railway. The natural channel for Indian trade to Persia is
• A subsequent telegram from the Secretary of State, dated 30th December, shows that the Russian Cons
favour an alignment via Tehran, Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman, but that the Russian Government prefer U
Consort ium
now favour an alignment via Tehran, Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman, hut that the Kussian Government prefer t hat th#
line should run from Tehran south-east to Kerman to avoid the possible risk of eventual intersection bj a Germaa
line at Ispahan.
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