File 3136/1914 Pt 2 ‘German War. Situation in Turkish Arabia & Persian Gulf’ [‎11v] (29/504)

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Under the stress of events in the main theatre of the war ’^^“fj^alned^to
the Near East, Germany was constrain
necessity of providing a diversion in the Near Eas , ^ fogt three weeks 0 f
intensify still further their pressure on the Turks g • i , cast i n t 0 the
October their pressure took yet another form, and a new w of secrecy, of
scale bv the importation into Constantinople, with cllCJ , n _ i n j- e( ^ u " n j er
large quantities of bullion consigned to the German Amba 7 do 7^ ti ^XVsonie
military guard at the Deutsche* Bank. The total of the
4,000,0001. This sum was far more than was necessaiy or , u e p eve t p a t a
German military and naval establishments, and I have every i £ Ministers
definite arrangement was arrived at between the Germans aac a j? should declare
including Enver Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , Talaat Bey, and Djemal I as a, a fio-ure. My
war as soon as the financial provision should Imve attained a the t p- r ^
information establishes the fact that a climax was reached a ou e 1 . •, q £q e
week in October, when it had been decided to confront the Grand Yizie^ tne
alternative of complicity or resignation, and that only t e ussian ^ i ^
Vistula, or some other more obscure cause, prevented this p an J om ? ppr+ain that
Whatever the exact history of the first three weeks of Oc o )er, i is
on or about the 26th of that month the German conspirators realised that the P aC ®
must be forced by still more drastic measures than they ha ye u^e , an i n i
further attempts to win over the Grand Vizier and the Turkish oveinmen ^ a
to their ideas and to induce them to declare war would he use ess. n j 1 a
an imnortant meeting of Committee leaders was held, at w ic
present, but which only decided to send Halil Bey, the President o e am er, °n
mission to Berlin. In the circles in which this decision became known i was re^ar^e
as a partial triumph for the Peace party, and as a fresh attempt to gain ime oi e
sake either of mere procrastination or of securing more conciete oners rom eimany.
Be that as it may, Halil Bey never left on his mission, and it is believed that its
abandonment was due to a more than usually blunt hint from the German repre
sentative in Constantinople. Whilst Constantinople generally was comforting itse
with the reflection that nothing could well happen until after the four days Ban am
festival, beginning on the 30th October, two events of capital importance occuried. ^
On the morning of the 29th I received intelligence from Egypt of the incursion into
the Sinai peninsula of an armed body of 2,000 Bedouins, who had occupied the wells
of Magdaba, and whose objective was an attack upon the Suez Canal. On learning this
news I at once proceeded to the Yali of the Grand Vizier, to acquaint him Ox the
serious consequences which must ensue if the expedition were not at once recalled.
His Highness received the intelligence with every appearance of surprise. He emphati
cally disclaimed all knowledge of it, and gave me the most solemn assurance that if the
facts were as stated he would at once issue orders for the withdrawal of the^ invading
party. He assured me once more that nothing was further from the intention of the
Government than war with Great Britain. It was unthinkable, he said, that an
expedition of this kind could have been organised by any member of the Government;
and he felt certain that if anything of the kind bad occurred, it could only have been
a raid by irresponsible Bedouins. I told his Highness that I feared that he deceived him
self. I reminded him of the various occasions on which he had given me similar assurances,
and of the negative results of the instructions which he had given on previous
occasions. I warned him of the disastrous consequences to the Ottoman Empire of a
crisis which could not now be long postponed unless he and the friends of peace were
prepared to take some serious stand against the conspiracy of which I was fully cognisant,
to involve it irretrievably in the general war. On this, as on every occasion of my
inverviews with the Grand Vizier, I was impressed with his inability to realise the facts
or to disabuse himself of the conviction, in spite of his many unfortunate experiences,
that he would be able, in a really serious crisis, to exert his authority with effect.
The second event of capital importance was the attack on Odessa and other
Bussian ports in the Black Sea on the morning of the same day, the 29th October. It is
now certain, that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the German
admiral on the evening of the 27th October, but it was not until after they had
actually taken place, that is, on the afternoon of the 29th October, when news of the
raid cm Odessa was telegraphed to me direct by Mr. Consul-General Boberts, that my
Bussian and French colleagues and myself realised that the die had actually been cast
and the crisis that we had so long feared and striven to avert had occurred. Imme
diately on receiving the news M. Bompard and I called on M. de Giers and decided to
ask for authority from our respective Governments to confront the Porte with the
alternative of rupture or dismissal of the German naval and military missions. On the