Coll 6/9 'Jeddah Reports Jany 1931–' [‎6v] (13/802)

III.— Relations with Powers outside Arabia.
492. In his conversation with His Majesty’s Minister on the loth December,
Ibn Sand referred to several matters of common interest: Iraq, the Yemen, the
Italians, Saudi aviation, and the supply of arms and Palestine.
493. Iraq. —The King began with Iraq. This seemed surprising at first,
but the immediate cause of anxiety was found to be that certain persons in Iraq
(Nuri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. was referred to later) were supposed to be preparing schemes for
settlement of the Palestine question “not in the interests of His Majesty’s
Government or of Palestine, but from personal ambition.” The King also
referred to the state of instability in Iraq. But he admitted that officially the
Iraq Government had always behaved correctly, even in the time of Hikmet
Sulaiman, whose Government, however, he was evidently glad to have seen the last
of.
494. The Yemen. —After the conclusion of the Italo-Yemen Treaty, said
Ibn Sand, he wrote to the Imam asking whether there was anything behind the
treaty. The Imam assured him there was not, and Ibn Saud accepted this state
ment, knowing the Imam to be a wide-awake man; but he would not answer for
the Imam’s sons, nor for the Yemeni officials.
495. Arms. —Ibn Saud said that as His Majesty’s Government knew he did
not want Italian arms, but did not want to offend the Italians. He refused the
offer of Italian rifles on the ground that his forces were equipped with Mausers
and he did not want to introduce another type, but the Italian Legation then
offered to provide Mausers from Germany or Austria. The King pleaded poverty,
but was assured that very easy terms would be arranged. Keeping to his delaying
tactics the King said that if samples could be supplied he would study the matter,
and there the question rested for the moment. Had he done right ? What would
His Majesty’s Government say? His Majesty’s Minister replied in terms which
had already been used at the Foreign Office in conversations with the Saudi
Minister. His Majesty’s Government had supplied all the arms they could spare.
Ibn Saud was the sole judge of his needs. It would evidently be safer to buy
from neutrals rather than from a Government like the Italian which, as the King
himself said, was not actuated by pure affection for Saudi Arabia; but if in the
end he could not escape the Italian offer he would at least be acting with his eyes
open. Ibn Saud said that he would continue to delay as long as possible, but there
usually came a moment in such cases when a decision could no longer be postponed.
It may be mentioned here that according to Fuad Hamza, who thought that
arrival of a supply of arms from British sources (paragraph 382) had stimulated
the Italians to greater efforts, the Italian Legation had offered to sell Italian guns,
anti-aircraft guns, in fact any war material that Ibn Saud might want.
496 Saudi A viation. —Ibn Saud said again that he wanted to get rid of the
Italians. He realised that to replace them by British or French might be
awkward, but that would not apply to replacement by Moslems. Could His
Majesty's Government recommend some suitable man from Egypt or Iraq? It
was found that he had in mind a sort of chief of staff to advise him on all arms
or, failing that, an expert to take charge of aviation. There are obvious
objections to the proposal, but His Majesty’s Minister has recommended it as a
means of eliminating the Italians and pleasing Ibn Saud.
497. Palestine. —Ibn Saud spoke with anxiety of his own position as
dependent upon that of His Majesty’s Government, which was endangered by
Zionism. Sir Reader Bullard noticed that, whereas in March it had seemed to
Ibn Saud amusing that Mussolini should wave the sword of Islam, he now
expressed astonishment at the extent to which, in spite of the notorious
ill-treatment of Arabs in Libya, Mussolini had been accepted by the Arabs as
their champion. The King could not agree that partition offered a hope of final
settlement, but on the contrary considered that it would be a dangerous irritant;
but he evidently could not believe that it would ever be effected. He seemed to
think that alternative schemes were being examined without his knowledge, and
expressed the hope that His Majesty’s Government would always communicate
to him as early as possible any important information about their Palestine policy.
On this last point Sir Reader Bullard was able to reassure him. To administer