Coll 17/2 'Arabia (Yemen). Relations between Iraq & Yemen. Treaty of Friendship.' [‎75r] (149/267)

.THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
■ — -
EASTERN (Arabia).
CONFIDENTIAL.
// [E 6221/6221/91] No. 1.
Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—[Received November 28.)
(No. 1030. Confidential.)
Sir, Cairo, November 18, 1932.
I HAVE the honour to inform you that Dr. Kadri, the Iraq consul-general,
called on the oriental secretary on the 14th instant to ask his advice on a
suggestion which he (Kadri) was thinking of making to King Feisal.
2. Dr. Kadri stated that he had been with King Feisal during His
Majesty’s recent trip to Transjordania. The King had then given him a sort
of private watching brief for Syria and Western Arabia. Dr. Kadri regarded
the situation in the Yemen as disquieting. The Imam was exposed to two
undesirable influences, namely, of the Soviets and of Italy. To both he was
showing himself very susceptible; to that of the Soviets, mainly because he
obtained supplies from them at uneconomic prices, to that of Italy because he
counted on Italy’s help against Ibn Saud. The hand of Italy was probably in
the Asir revolt which might or might not be supported by Imam Yehia. The
entry of the Soviets and Italy into Arabia was a danger to British interests.
There could be no doubt about Iraq’s interest in excluding Soviet influence. As
regards Italy, the Arabs had seen too clearly how she had behaved in Tripoli
to have the slightest wish that she should enter the Arabian field. It was true
that Italy was anti-Ibn Saud, but Iraq preferred that Ibn Saud should remain
in control of the Hejaz for the present. Iraq would gradually grow stronger,
and would eventually be in a position to help the suffering tribes of the Hejaz
without outside help.
3. In the above circumstances, Iraq’s interest was that the Imam Yehia
should not succumb to Soviet or Italian blandishments. In Dr. Kadri’s opinion,
Iraq, by diplomatic representation in the Yemen, could influence the Imam and
not onlv withdraw him from Soviet and Italian toils, but also make him realise
the folly of his attitude towards Aden. Dr. Kadri concluded by saying that he
did not wish to make suggestions to King Feisal which might result in bringing
His Majesty into opposition with the British. That was why he would appreciate
our advice on the opportunity of such a suggestion.
4. In reply, Mr. Smart said that the Yemen was outside his competence, and
that he could not offer any advice on the subject. He suggested, however, that
the establishment of an Iraq diplomatic mission in the Y emen at this moment,
when trouble was reported in Asir, might be misinterpreted by Ibn Saud.
Dr. Kadri finally said that he would refrain for the present from making any
suggestion to King Feisal in that sense.
5 . Dr. Kadri then went on to speak of the disastrous condition of the Hejaz
owing to the exploitation by Nejd and to the decline of the pilgrimage due to
Wahabi iconoclastic proclivities. He also maintained that in Nejd itself there
was discontent with Ibn Saud, whose support was now mainly drawn from the
towns. The tribesmen, especially those of the late Feisal-al-Dawish and of Ibn
Bujad, were ready on the occurrence of any favourable diversion to break out
again. In fact, both in the Hejaz and Nejd a general flare-up would follow any
signally successful tribal revolt against Ibn Saud in any part of his territories.
& 6 . Dr. Kadri mentioned that he had seen Hafiz Amer Bey, the Egyptian
consul at Jedda, who has just returned to Egypt on leave (see Mr. Hope Gill’s
telegram No. 262 of the 10th November). Amer Bey had described to him the
pitiful state of the Hejaz as a result of the Saudian regime. A meeting between
Amer Bey and the Iraq consul-general may be quite a normal and innocent
proceeding, but, in view of Amer Bey s anti-Ibn Saud reputation at Jedda, it
is interesting to’note that, immediately on his return from Jedda. he should have
discussed with Dr. Kadri the Saudian regime in an apparently unfriendly spirit.
I am endeavouring to secure information of Amer Bey’s doings generally during
his leave.
* *7
/ ' ' /
November 28, 1932.
i r '' r) j
— Section 3.