'Najd-Transjordan Boundary' [‎120r] (244/358)

Negotiations at a Deadlock on the Question of Capitulations.
14. I saw Ibn Sand the next morning and, finding that his advisers had described
the situation correctly, I informed him categorically that I was unable to accede to his
demand. He remained firm and insisted that he could sign no treaty unless the
jurisdiction of his courts was fully recognised in all cases, both civil and criminal, and
m regard to foreigners as well as natives. I urged that His Majesty’s Government
had already made a great concession in article 6 and begged him to reflect before he
wrecked the treaty by persisting m a demand to which it was beyond my power to
accede ; but he refused to give way and a rupture appeared almost inevitable.
Solution of the Capitulations Difficulty.
15;. Mr. Antonius then had one ipore private interview with Dr. Abdullah
Damlnji and Sheikh Hafez \\ ahba in the hope of finding some solution at the eleventh
houi, and it transpired at length that there had been a misunderstanding and some
confusion of ideas m the Kings mind. Article 6, far from being regarded as a
concession, had given rise to grave suspicion in the minds of Ibn Sand’s advisers, who
interpreted it as an attempt to obtain recognition of the principle of Capitulations
under the guise of a concession in regard to a specific portion of them. They had
communicated their suspicions to the King, wdro, having hitherto maintained the
attitude of ignoring the existence of Capitulations altogether, immediately became
alarmed and took up an extreme attitude.
Conclusion and Signature of Treaty.
16. The situation was now clear and Ibn Sand’s advisers, having been reassured
as to the intention of iflis Majesty’s Government, suggested that the elimination of the
offending article and the addition of a vague, and I consider innocuous, sentence at
the end of article 5 would probably secure agreement. I saw the King the next
morning and proposed this solution, to which he agreed at once.
The final text was then prepared and the treaty was duly signed and the letters
exchanged on the evening of the 20th May, at the conclusion of a dinner which the
King gave in honour of the mission. The texts are enclosed herein.
Questions outside the Scope of Treaty.
17. I will now explain the action taken in regard to certain questions which are
dealt with in my instructions, but which do not fall within the compass of the treaty.
]\)sition of Iraq.
18. In paragraph 6 of my letter of instructions I w r as directed to explain to
Ibn Sand the position of the Iraq Government and to proceed to an exchange of notes
recognising that, while Iraq is outside the scope of the treaty, His Majesty’s consular
officers in the Hejaz and Nejd may afford protection to Iraqis in those territories so
long as Iraq does not herself maintain representatives there.
Postponement of Iraq Question.
19. I had intended to deal with this question after conclusion of the negotiations,
and I did not anticipate that it would give rise to any difficulty. Unfortunately, the
question of nationality and that of tribunals, dealt with in articles 5 and 6 of the draft
treaty, had produced a very acute situation, and I was convinced that if I raised the
question of Iraq I should once more provoke grave, even though unfounded, suspicion
and probably wreck the treaty irretrievably. I therefore decided that it was necessary
to postpone the question for the present. It is a question of fact and not of negotiation,
and can properlv be communicated through the usual official channels to the Government
of the Hejaz and of Nejd at some convenient time, possibly when the exchange of
ratifications takes place.
Hejaz Nationality Law.
20. Ifor similar reasons I thought it unwise to discuss the objections put forward
by His Majesty’s Government to certain articles in the Hejaz Nationality Law,
promulgated on the 29th September, 1926. The matter is not one of immediate
urgency, and will be better dealt with by His Majesty’s consul at Jeddah after the
treaty has been ratified.
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