Coll 5/73 ‘Afghan Air Force: reports by British Military Attache Kabul 1 November 1947 to 31 October 1947’ [‎5r] (9/56)

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dr \. i * * * + d f 11 knowlod g e of the terms of the agreements. /ifter six months, when he
got to know me better, he agreed to sign the contracts when they arrived from
England.^ The original contracts I had received contained a demand for such
a great increase in pay from the Afghans to meet the increased cost of living
that I had asked the Air Ministry to reduce their demands to something a little
higher only than the sums originally agreed upon verbally. I knew the Afghans
could not pay such great increases and that we should lose our detachment.
Ministry on being informed of the situation re-drafted the contracts
upon recommendations, which included a slight rise in pay which I felt sure
ti.e Afghans, if tactfully approached, would agree to. It was these new contracts
that the C,G.S. declared himself ready to sign when they arrived. He also
agreed to the small increase of pay and commenced payment before the arrival of
tixe contracts. The C.G.S., who was a reasonable individual, though slow,
became ill and went abroad before the contracts arrived. In his place was
appointed an unintelligent man who was also obstinate and hoped by delaying not
to A vo to beard the finance department. He has offered every resistance to
tne signing oi the contracts, though upon each visit he has promised to do so
immediately (for the last eight months).
It is worth adding that the contracts as drafted now for simplification and
easy comprehension by the Afghans have been me.de uniform by me, rank by rank,
c..nd contain ep.sy round sums. Previously, some R.A.F. personnel were employed
on one set of teruis and some on another which made the whole problem apparently
difficult for the ‘Afghans to grasp. I have seen that if the Afghans do not grasp
a problem, they become suspicious. Once the simple terms I have drawn up in
conjunction with the Air Ministry are grasped, things will be easier, Such
problems as future increased cost of living and devaluation of currency will
complicate matters, but at least I shall have a clearly recorded base to work
from. There are signs that with the recent appointment of a new War Minister
a man of influence, energy and drive, the contracts will be signed and with them
tre outstanding allowances of R.A.P. personnel will be paid. If so, over a year’s
hard work (which actually involves trivial matters which could be settled in a
civilized country in a few hours) will have been settled.
Apart from consolidating the R.A.F's position in the above respect, it is
even more important to make the R.A.F. detachment indispensable on account of
their work. ^ This is a still more ticklish problem, as the War Ministry has shown
little (thougn increasing) interest in its air force. Consequently it has had
little interest in the R.A.F. detachment and its often frustrated efforts to become
indispensable. The danger is that lack of interest and lack of knowledge of its
potential very real worth, may also result in a belief that the detachment is
really only a luxury to be dispensed with.
I cannot tell the imr Ministry its job, though I have gradually by hints and
remarks been able to stimulate its interest in the detachment’s potentialities.
They do not, however, realise that if the R.A.F. Officers' ideas and suggestions
were fully implemented and their efforts at instruction conscientiously followed,
their Aii Force which is little more than a normal squadron could quickly
become a really good force. The Afg.A.F. and the instructors are, however,
still remote in the minds of the War Ministry. The R.Afg.A.F. is still an
unhealthy appendix to the Afghan Army. But the gulf has been narrowed. My efforts
to find, and the Air Ministry's efforts to provide, instructors who have the
patience and tact to work harmoniously with the exasperating Afghans have produced
good dividends. The present team are gradually showing their worth both in pilot
and techruca! instruction and in drawing up schemes for civil aviation, the expansion
oi the Air Force and better organisation and administration. They have
themselves helped to draw the j.ir Force closer to the Defence Ministry, although
practically none of their recommendations .have been implemented. The pilot
instructor by personally piloting very important personages has thus stimulated
interest in his party and in civil aviation as an offshoot of the Air Force,
i 13 k °P cd that h y hints a n d suggestions, though one must wait to be asked, I can
showthe new War Minister the advantages to be gained if students attend lectures
and instruction provided more frequently and the advantages of new simplified
° ° r 5 an ^ S f t:L ° n administration to replace the present unworkable system.
Then the R.^.l. detachment’s position will have been fully consolidated and as I
am convinced of the desirability of the detachment as a mark of England’s continued
interest in Afghanistan now that the latter feels lonely and isolated and from ?he
point of view of British prestige, then something will have been achieved.