Coll 28/9(2) ‘Persia; Internal affairs; including new Labour Law of 1946 and general labour conditions in Persia.’ [‎33r] (65/134)

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TANNIC MAJESTY’S'GOYERNMENT
PERSIA.
ILmentt
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CONFIDENTIAL. Under Secretary or atate Section 1.
no
INDIA D1KECT
June 21, 1!)41.
a/s * Mu*
[E 3224/42/34]
for Foreign Affairs
l^AUG 19M
Copy No.
»S//* R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received June 21.)
Confidential.)
91
^^ijrLOO ^
(No.«4 Confidential.) M ,nn. 1 , 4 .
I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report by the press attach^ Lf- ,
on the internal situation, in continuation of the report which was enclosed in mV a LS
despatch No. 4 of the 21st February last to the Minister of Information (despatch 1 ~ c \
No. 35 to you). ~ ^
ss Lambton has done well to raise the question of the attitude that
should be adopted by His Majesty’s Government if there should be a movement
against the Shah strong enough to drive him from his capital if not from the
country. The question is now of great importance, in view of the fact that
German intrigues are trying to foment internal trouble in Syria, Palestine and
Iraq, and that public opinion in Iran is almost solidly against the Shah and
almost as solidly persuaded that the Shah would not be on the throne were it not
for the British. The question is of too great urgency to be dealt with only in a
despatch, and I therefore propose not to comment further here, but to raise the
question by telegram.
3. A copy of this despatch and enclosure is being forwarded to the Ministry
of Information; the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office; the
Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department; His
Majesty’s Ambassadors at Angora, Bagdad and Moscow; and to the Middle East
Intelligence Centre, Cairo.
I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.
iH
'Vr
£
Enclosure.
Miss Lambton to Sir R. Bullard.
(Confidential.)
Sir, Tehran, May 1 , 1941.
I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch of the 21st February, 1941, and
to transmit to you the following report :—
2. The improvement in the state of public opinion noted in my above-
mentioned despatch has not been maintained. Enemy, and especially German,
victories in the Balkans and North Africa have caused us to lose what ground we
had gained. It is true, however, that increasing American aid and the pronounce
ments of American leaders have done something to prevent a complete collapse
of our stock. It is, moreover, interesting to note that the older army officers,
though not, in general, the younger, are disposed to believe that, whatever defeats
we may suffer at present and in the near future, we shall eventually be victorious.
3. The coup d'Etat in Iraq did not arouse much general interest locally.
The Germans and their friends attempted, and still attempt, to make out that
it was accomplished with Axis support. Generally speaking, this propaganda
has been ineffective. The Persians cannot believe that, Iraq being, as they firmly
believe, our puppet, we could possibly have allowed the Axis to gain influence
there. A coup d'Etat engineered by the Axis was therefore, as they see it, quite
out of the question, and hence they suppose that it was some deep-laid British
plan which demanded for its accomplishment that a semblance of pro-Axis
tendencies be given to the coup d'Etat.
4. The arrival of Imperial troops in Basra after the coup d’Etat in Iraq
had, on the whole, a reassuring effect on our friends, while it annoyed our enemies.
It was the occasion for German and pro-German circles to indulge in violent
ri9—94]
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UAUG1941
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