Coll 28/9(2) ‘Persia; Internal affairs; including new Labour Law of 1946 and general labour conditions in Persia.’ [‎33v] (66/134)

2
anti-British propaganda. The*chief result, however, of the arrival of Imperial
troops in Basra has been to bring home to Iranians the nearness of the war to
Iran, and, as the cause of the realisation of such an unpleasant fact, it has not
been a welcome event, and has given rise to considerable anxiety.
5. The general belief that Turkey will not fight is maintained. There are
various reasons for this, among them an innate dislike of the Turks which seeks
to fasten on any grounds for abuse of them; in other words, the Persians would
like to see them default on their treaty obligations in order that their already
low r opinion of the Turks may be reinforced. Also, if the Turks do not fight, there
is less likelihood of Iran having to fight, and there are few Persians to whom
the possibility of remaining at peace does not appeal. Lastly, there is the fact
that German propaganda has been actively pushing the idea that Turkey will
not fight.
6 . The chief preoccupation, as war draws nearer to Iran, is, needless to
say, the attitude of Russia. It is feared that Russia may occupy Northern Iran
either with the consent of Germany, who, it is thought, may have offered Russia
Northern Iran in return for Russian acquiescence in German conquests elsewhere,
or in order to safeguard her own interests against an advancing and aggressive
Germany. The hope that the Russian menace may be removed once and for all
by a German victory is thus no longer widely entertained; both in the event of
Russo-German co-operation or of Russo-German opposition, it seems to the
Iranians that they are in danger from the Russians.
7. In spite of the undoubted anxiety and fear to which the approach of war
> towards Iran gives rise, the apparent likelihood of German intervention in Iran
! is generally welcomed. There is, of course, a minority of pro-British Persians who
regret—I would not say oppose—it, and a small minority (who are not necessarily
anti-German) whose material interests are bound up with the continuance of
affairs as they are and therefore do not want any change. For the rest, there are the
minority who are pro-German by conviction, and the vast majority of the people
who hate the Shah and consistently attribute his sins to the British Government.
These sections of the people would welcome any change, except perhaps the coming
of the Russians, though there are some who would even welcome this. To such
• people even the spread of war to Iran seems preferable to the continuance of the
present regime, but it should not be supposed that they contemplate active
j participation by Iran in the war, but rather that the present Government will
be overthrown by German intervention. They reason that the disorders which
would inevitably result from the extension of the war to Iran would enable them
to get rid of the present regime; indeed, they conceive that as the only way in
which the removal of the Shah can be secured. Among those who hope for this
r reason for German intervention in Iran are the army officers mentioned in para
graph 2 , who, although they tend to consider that we shall be victorious in the
end, believe that the only way to get a change of Government is German interven
tion in Iran. British intervention could only be expected to perpetuate the
present regime, which, as has so often been stated, is in local opinion the puppet
of the British : hence they hope German intervention to bring about the change
desired. With the exception possibly of a few army officers and others, the idea
that Iran should fight in the event of an aggression against her is not entertained.
The general attitude is that, apart from the fact that Iran is obviously too weak
to be able to stand up to either the Germans or the Russians, there is no reason
for them to fight : they hate the Shah, and so why, they ask, should they fight to
perpetuate his rule, and as for fighting to preserve their independence, what with
the Shah and the British they do not consider they have any independence. Let
the Germans come, they argue, for they will help us to get rid of the Shah, and
after that we will see.
8 . With regard to the attitude of the Shah himself, there seems reason to
believe that the present situation is causing him much anxiety. There also seems
reason to suppose that he will be guided by opportunism and will turn to which
ever side appears to him to offer the most immediate gain to himself. It is thought
j that he does not entertain the possibility of resistance by Iran to aggression by
Germany or Russia, and that if he could buy off either he would do so, whatever
the true interests of his country demanded.
9. It would appear that it is now time to consider our policy towards the
Shah in the event of a German or Russian occupation of Northern Iran, which can