'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎107v] (219/294)

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chief of the Syrian volunteers came next in importance, followed by an
old freebooter of the Palestine hills who led the local bands. Fauzi's
usual headquarters was in a village North of Nablus which was conveniently
placed, for the receipt of arms from Syria via the Samakh neighbourhood
or from brans--Jordan along unobtrusive routes: it also offered an out
let of escape across the Jordan if necessary. From this base and
arsenal Fauzi would move out from time to time to two or three selected
villages which were better placed for staging attacks on communications
but which were rather too near the roads to be healthy for long
occupation. Certain villages in different parts of the country also
served as collecting centres for arms smuggled over the frontiers or
landed on the coast. In the arms traffic hashish smugglers, v/ho knew
the secret routes and good hiding places, played a large part. The
best arms and ammunition, apart from a certain number of recent Iraqi
Army stock, were reputed to be those from Syria, of which the rebels
were thought to receive a steady supply.
The bands remained steadfastly in the hills v/hich formed their
natural fighting ground and which facilitated their guerrilla tactics.
There alone they had superior mobility, they v/ere on familiar ground
and knew equally v/ell the covered approaches to the main communications
and the tracks v/hich offered the best ways of retreat. In the hills
in fact they felt that they could take as much or as little of the
fighting as they pleased. They were credited from time to time with
intentions of descending into the plains to attack Jewish settlements,
but little more than long range sniping was ever attempted and it is
probable that it was a fear of exposing themselves in open country to
attack by aircraft and mobile troops that was the chief factor in
keeping them on the hills. The bands preferred to stage attacks on
troox^s and convoys in the afternoon, knowing that' the troops could
seldom keep contact after dark and v/ere usually withdrav/n at dusk.
The rebels could thus place a limit on any engagement, and could make
good use of the withdrawal of troops under heavy sniping just before
dark to establish a o.laim of , *victory ,, , an opportunity of which they
took the fullest advantage.
A fair sample of the better type of band is afforded by the group
shown in Photograph No. 2, which is composed chiefly of Iraqis and Syrians.
Most of these foreign elements had had some military service and
X30ssessed a rough knowledge of tactics: they would fight in groups of
five to seven men moving under the cover of fire from other sections.
Movement would often be controlled by whistle, and retirements seemed
to be carried out on a pre-arranged plan. They made good use of cover,
and followed up rapidly when troops withdrew. They were capable of
putting up a good resistance in defence and could carry out an ordered
retreat, but like most Arabs shov/ed little inclination to advance in an
attack and x^referred to depend upon fire action alone from behind good
cover. Against aircraft the rebels develox)ed a good line of tactics
as a result of experience: the parties being attacked would take cover
immediately without attempting to reply, while others who were not under
attack would engage the aeroplane with a steady and well-directed fire
which was often successful in finding its target. The fighting ability
of the Palestinian F ell ah v/hile below that of the foreign elements,
surpassed expectation. Although inexperienced, he shov/ed himself
courageous and undeterred by heavy losses. His arms and ammunition
were inierior and his marksmanship indifferent, but he was an adept at
bandit” uactics being a skilled ambusher and a genius at disappearing
at the right moment.
As a rule the bands were skilful in staging attacks under the
conditions most favourable to themselves, and v/ere careful to seek out
the weaker spots as their objectives. For instance convoys v/ere
chosen to begin with until the protective arrangements were strengthened,