PZ 4718/1934 ‘Historical Memorandum on Bahrein.’ [‎24r] (47/48)

45
their accession, or of any formal acknowledgment by Bahrein
on such occasions of sovereignty or suzerainty such as might
be expected from a Sheikh who regarded himself as a vassal
of Persia. Nor does any protest at the absence of any such
formal acknowledgment appear at any time to have been
made by Persia.
151. The correspondence of 1869-70, to which particular
attention has been paid by Persia in the past, and which may
be thought the strongest contention that Persia is in a
position to put forward, may indeed be quoted as evidence of
the view taken by Her Majesty’s Government at that period
of the relation of Persia to Bahrein. But it cannot be valid
as against the Sheikhs, and while it is sufficiently loosely
expressed to afford some justification for the construction
which has been placed on it by Persia, it is relevant that
the construction placed on it by Her Majesty’s Ambassador
at Constantinople, and supported by the Government of
India, passed without challenge in 1871 (paragraph 102);
that a similar interpretation was placed on it, with a
minimum of preliminary discussion, in 1.886 (paragraph 110);
that at frequent intervals between 1870 and 1880 His
Majesty’s Government maintained the independence of
Bahrein against Turkey (paragraphs 99-107 above); that so
early as January 1870 they drew the attention of the
Turkish Government to the British Note of 1851 (para
graph 61 above); and that His Majesty’s Government have
uninterruptedly maintained the independence of Bahrein
against Persia and Turkey alike since the date of the
correspondence in question.
152. The Sheikhs themselves appear, particularly in the
early part of the past century, before their relations with
Her Majesty’s Government were placed on a more definite
footing by the Agreements of 1880 and 1892, to have been
guided by a consideration of their own immediate interests
in deciding on the line of policy to he adopted towards the
stronger rulers by whom they were surrounded. But not
only is it now almost three-quarters of a century since any
appeal, however flimsy, appears to have been made to Persia
bv Bahrein, but the present Sheikh (like his predecessor)
is" keenly apprehensive of any recognition of the lersian
claim, to which he is most strongly opposed.
C—Attitude of British Government, 1820-1934.
153 From 1820 onwards His Majesty’s Government
insistently dealt with the Sheikhs as independent rulers,
rhev concluded treaties with them on that basis in 1820,
1847 1861, 1868, 1880 and 1892, and they have been
prepared to maintain their independence ^
,r P on occasion by forcible methods ^ am * t ^ a ' len i*
■rom outside whether from Persia, Turkey, EgJP
Wahabis. They originally entered int0 ( ara .
Sheikhs and promised them a measure p
Tnoh 161 in the interests of securing the P® ac . e “ ,
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . In the early stages of those relations they
ippear to have been solely concerned to , 13 'j ever
1820 they even offered their “f tribute
aot accepted by Peisia, to secure t re ^ r f ct ed their inter-
to Persia by the Sheikhs), a ^ gj^pdom to the
ference with the internal c . tg of British subjects,
minimum required to secure t ^piish a protectorate
They were consistently reluc a ^ j embarrassments
over Bahrein in view of the probable fficaym
in regulating the succession, &c., m wmc ^
2953