'Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Persian Gulf' [‎6v] (17/94)

4
Military-
strategical
considera
tions.
Turkish and
Persian
boundary
on the
Shat-al-
Arab.
British
engage
ments
with the
Sheikh of
Muhamrah.
Terminus
of the
Baghdad
Railway.
SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that the effect of the construction of the
railway to Basra was to facilitate the concentration of a large army in Southern
Mesopotamia. Phis army was not likely to be that of an European Power, but a
Turkish one. It might number 100,000 men or more, and, as we have no army with
which we could encounter this force, we would be powerless to prevent the Turks
occupying Ivoweit, if they so desired. The Turks could do more. They could equally
easily invade Mohammerah and Persia, and cut our projected railway up the Karun
Valley. The Persian army was negligible. For these reasons it appeared to him that
the extension of the railway beyond Basra to Koweit or elsewhere did not materially
alter the military strategical conditions.
LORD KITCHENER thought that the determination of the line of the frontier
between Turkey and Persia along the Shat-al-Arab constituted an important factor in
the general question, and suggested that the lever of our assent to the increase of the
Customs duties might be employed to secure the withdrawal of the Turkish claims to
the left bank.
SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that there w 7 as no question but that Persia had the
right of access.
MR. PARKER said that the Anglo-Russian Commission, which held meetings in
1850 to settle the Turco-Persian frontier, arrived at no settlement, but that the Turks
had a copy of a sketch map prepared by this Commission. The main object in view at
that time was to secure freedom of navigation to Mohammerah. One object of the
Commission was to prevent either Turkey or Persia erecting fortifications on the
banks.
SIR EDWARD OREL said that, whatever the true boundary, the question might
ultimately resolve itself into a question of military superiority. The Turks were
actually in occupation of territory indubitably Persian elsewhere.
SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that v r e appeared to rely on Persia being
friendly to us, which he did not think was the case.
I
LORD KITCHENER thought that the Persians probably would be so in the face
of Turkish aggression.
SIR EDWARD GREY said that according to the sketch map the waterway
belongs to Turkey, while the left bank belongs to Mohammerah. We have special
engagements with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who is a semi-independent feudal chief
under the suzerainty of Persia.
MR. FERARD said that local usage recognised mid-stream as the boundary.
SIR EDWARD GREY said that probably w r e should have to bargain. We had a
locus standi in view of our engagements with the Sheikh of Mohammerah.
MR. PARKER said that w r e had assured the Sheikh of Mohammerah that
we would protect him against naval attack by a foreign Power, whatever pretext for
such action may be alleged, and also that we would continue to give him our good
offices and support so long as he should remain faithful to the Shah and act in
accordance with our advice. 4
LORD ESHER said that in the event of our being forced to seize the terminus of
the Baghdad Railway it would be easier to hold Koweit than Basra.
SIR EDWARD GREY said that one good argument against Koweit as a terminus
for the railway was that if we seize Kow r eit the railway still has Basra as an outlet, so
we should be little better off as regards our hold on the railway. If, on the other
hand, the railway is not extended to Koweit, there is less likelihood of questions of the
Sheikh’s autonomy being raised, and complicated negotiations as to Customs dues
would be avoided. We acquired our title to the land at Koweit not because we wanted
the railway to come there, but because we wanted to have a say in the matter when it