'Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Persian Gulf' [‎18r] (40/94)

Sheikh of Koweit’s territory. The entrance to the Shatt-el-Arab is only guarded by a
small fort at Fao, the capture of which would offer little difficulty; but it would seem
desirable to avoid entering territory indisputably Turkish, or attacking Turkish forces,
unless these had invaded the Sheikh’s territory.
It is, ol course, possible that the Turks might anticipate us by occupying Koweit,
over which they are understood to claim suzerainty, but such action, besides being
dangerous in the face of the opposition of the Arabs, especially the Muntifik and other
tribes west of'the Euphrates, who are always in a state of partial revolt against Turkish
rule, would be of so unfriendly a nature that it may be doubted whether the Turks
would take it.
Our occupation of Koweit might lead to the reinforcement of the Turkish garrison
in and around Bussorah, but it may be that no deliberate attempt to turn us out of
Koweit would be made. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that even a
comparatively small British force would be unable to hold its own in circumstances
peculiarly favourable to defence, especially if supported by the Navy from the sea, and
by the Arabs inland.
The force to be dispatched from India should be as small as is consistent with safety,
the climatic conditions in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. during the summer months being unfavourable.
It might perhaps suffice to send two battalions of native infantry and a native mountain
battery, together with personnel for a small camel corps, the camels being purchased on
the spot. The opinion of the Indian military authorities should, however, be obtained
as to the strength and composition of the force. It would also seem prudent that an
adequate reinforcement should be held in readiness in India, and that arrangements
should be made for its early dispatch should an emergency occur.
It must be understood that the occupation of Koweit is only suggested as a means
of temporarily putting pressure on Turkey without the use of actual force. The
occupation is not suggested as the first step in an offensive .campaign, nor should it be
regarded as a preliminary to further operations in the direction of Bussorah or Bagdad.
Such operations would not meet the contingency of a war with Turkey, and it is not
proposed that in the event of war the British line of advance should ascend the valley
of the Euphrates.
As regards the possible effect of our occupation of Koweit m other directions, the
Turkish countermove might take the form of a concentration of Turkish troops upon the
eastern frontier of Egypt. Although the Turkish army is not just now in a position to
undertake offensive operations upon a large scale, owing partly to the reorganisation
which has only recently been begun, and partly to the troubles in Albania, with ^ the
Druses and in the Yemen, it is possible that a concentration on a moderate scale might
be effected. This measure and a consequent stirring up of unrest in Egypt are not
improbable, if we put pressure on. Turkey at Koweit or elsewhere. It seems important,
therefore, that if it be decided to occupy Koweit we should, be ready to reinforce the
British garrison m Egypt, which at present is only sufficient for the preservation of
order.
^ It mav be added that on its present footing, and pending the completion of the
scheme of reorganisation now in progress, the Turkish Army is calculated to provide
29 army corps of 1st line troops (18 cavalry brigades, and 58 divisions, of an aggregate
strength of 25,000 cavalrv, 580,000 infantry, and 1,600 guns).
When the reorganisation is completed, the^number of army corps will be increased
to 38 with 20 reserve divisions in addition, giving a total of 14 cavalry brigades, and
92 divisions, of an aggregate strength of 25,000 cavalry, 920,000 infantry, and
A200 guns.
His anticipated that the reorganisation will be completed in 1915 ; it will involve
heavy expenditure on personnel and materiel, and it is possible that the requisite func s
may not be forthcoming. j ,, , • • n
The rank and file of the Turkish Army are of excellent quality, and the training of
the troops, especially in Europe, has greatly improved under their German instructional
staff. Hitherto the weak spot m the army has been the officers, but here also a marked
improvement has taken place both in the junior and in the senior ran £S.
General Staff, War Office,