'Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Persian Gulf' [‎20r] (44/94)

that we shall find at the last moment that the branch line has become the main one
and that the section between Zobair and Kuwait has been abandoned.
17. Even after the section to Kuwait has been built, if the navigation of the river
is improved so as to admit deep-draught ships without risk, Kuwait will probably be
abandoned by the trade in favour of Basrah on account of the greater facilities which
exist at the latter place.
18. The conclusions that have been forced upon me by the above considerations are
as follows:—
(l.) That, from a seaman’s point of view, the harbour of Kuwait offers very few
advantages, if any, over the river, and that, if the navigation of the river is improved,
the latter will not be inferior in any respect.
( 2 .) That, as the natural terminus of the railway is at Basrah, the trade will go
there in preference to Kuwait, whatever we may do to prevent it, provided that the
former provides facilities over the latter.
(3.) That it is imperative to take steps at once on our own initiative to regularise
the situation as regards the navigation of the Shatt-al-’Arab.
(4.) That the river should be placed in the hands of a Commission, preferably
consisting of the three Powers—Persia, Turkey, and Great Britain.
(5.) That, failing this, a Commission should be constituted on the lines of the
European Commission of the Danube.
( 6 .) That a British Engineer with suitable assistance should be appointed to advise
on and undertake works for the improvement of the navigation of the river.
19. It now becomes necessary to consider the steps that we should take to bring
Turkey to terms if she should become recalcitrant.
Firstly, all signs of Turkish sovereignty might be removed from the shores of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , Bubiyan and Um-Kasr handed over to Sheikh Mubarak, and that Chief
at the same time properly safeguarded. This can be done without any increase of the
present force in the Gulf, but it would probably only irritate the Porte without being in
any way effective.
Secondly, we could occupy Fao and the adjacent country and inform the Porte
that unless they quickly came to terms we should blockade the river and stop the trade
of Basrah and Baghdad. This would probably reduce the Turks to reason, but if we
had to enforce the blockade in order to make them yield it would severely injure our
trade for the time, and for that reason would be very unpopular with our own people
and with the Arabs. We should require a force of troops to carry out this scheme.
Thirdly, we could take advantage of Turkey’s difficulties in Arabia and threaten
her line of communication to Hodeida. If carried out, this would result in the loss of
Southern Arabia to Turkey, and probably also that of the whole of the peninsula, for it
is unlikely that, having once turned the Turk out of Southern Arabia, the Arabs would
stop before Mecca and Medina were once again in their hands. This would be a very
extreme measure to take, but at the same time it is that which would be most likely to
be immediately effective. It is a course, however, which I would hesitate to recommend
unless another were not possible.
I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMOND J. W. SLADE,
The Secretary _ Rear-Admiral.
to the Government of India,
Marine Department.