'Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Persian Gulf' [‎21r] (46/94)

maintaining a sufficient depth to enable ocean-going steamers to cross the bar of the
Shatt-el-Arab (which is 10 miles in length) at all times of tide, would undoubtedly be
considerable. It would be possible to avoid this difficulty by cutting a ship canal from
the vicinity of Bussorah to the Khor Zobeir (a continuation of the Khor Um Kasr and
the Khor Abdulla); but the time occupied in navigating the canal, and then the
channel to the open sea, would be a drawback, in so far as passenger traffic and the
carriage of mails are concerned.
Two other places have been suggested as possible terminal ports, namely, Fao and
Has Kathama, at the head of Koweit Bay.
Fao.
Except for greater proximity to the sea, Fao, which lies inside the bar of the
Shatt-el-Arab, has all the disadvantages and none of the commercial advantages of
Bussorah.
Ras Kathama.
The depth of 20 feet at low-water is about £ mile or upwards from the shore.
It would therefore be necessary to run out a pier at considerable expense. The
construction of wharves would be much more costly than at Bunder Shweikh.
Under these circumstances we strongly recommend that the strip of foreshore at
Bunder Shweikh should be acquired as proposed, since (a) it would undoubtedly he an
asset in negotiations for British participation in the railway; and (b) even if these
negotiations were to prove abortive, it would be expedient to consolidate our position at
Koweit, in order to counterbalance the prejudicial effects of any German port which
may possibly be constructed in the neighbourhood at some future time.
But, while we hold that the leasing of land at Bunder Shweikh is a step in the
right direction, we do not consider that the possession of this harbour alone by Great
Britain would exclude the Germans from access to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . It would no
doubt render our co-operation in the railway more desirable, but it would not make it
indispensable.
The position of this country would indeed be incalculably stronger if his Majesty’s
Government were to secure rights of pre-emption or priority of lease in regard to
Warba Island and Bubiyan Island, since both command the approaches to the Khor
Abdulla and Khor Um Kasr, as also the commodious anchorage on the south of Warba
Island. We entirely concur in the view expressed by the Government of India in their
letter of the 4th February, 1904, namely, that—
“ With the shores of the mainland and of Bubiyan Island in the possession of a single
Power, the anchorages below Um Kasr and at Warbu Island can at any time be converted into
an impregnable harbour, and even if the day is still distant when the banks of the Khor Abdulla
are likely to be armed with foreign forts or batteries, the undivided occupation by a German
Railway" Company of a potentially invulnerable position is not calculated to conduce to the
enhancement either of British commercial prosperity or of British political prestige.”
We therefore recommend, if diplomatic considerations permit, that the Sheikh of
Koweit should be invited to specify the nature of his claims to Warba Island, to which
he is understood frequently to have referred ; and that the continued occupation of
Bubiyan Island by the Turkish post, in derogation of the Sheikh’s territorial claims
(which have been recognised and supported by His Majesty’s Government), should be
neutralized by the establishment forthwith of a Koweiti post, with the countenance oi
His Majesty’s Government, on Warba Island, or, if that should prove undesirable, on
the northern shore of Bubiyan Island. If practicable, we would even recommend the
establishment of posts on both islands.
We desire to emphasize the importance which we attach to the effective assertion
of the Sheikh’s territorial claims kyBubiyan.
WA wish to record our conviction that, once the railway has been constructed, the
economic penetration under German influence will be so formidable as in the course of
time seriously to undermine our position—political, commercial, and strategic m the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . The recent institution of a line of subsidised steamships plying between
Hamburg and the Gulf already marks the interest of Germany in those regions. We
would therefore venture to express the conclusion that every effort should be made to
insure a fair measure of British control over the terminus of the Bagdad Bail way.
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