'Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Persian Gulf' [‎32v] (69/94)

Sir N. O’Conor, j n a despatch dated the 26 th June Sir N. O’ Conor reported a conversation with
Yery^Confidential Grand Vizier on the situation :—
June 26, 1906. “. . . . Although the Sultan had agreed to the appointment of Joint Commissioners, he was
disinclined to allow them to report what was incontestably the fact that 1 assova was situated
within the Persian frontier, and should be evacuated. His Highness added that he had staked
his influence and reputation with the Sultan by assuring His Majesty that if he agieed to
withdraw his troops from Passova he would manage to do so without any loss of prestige to the
Caliphate, and that possibly they might get some compensation in the direction of Soujboulak
and Bayazid, where Persian troops had occupied some places which weie clearly outside their
proper frontier. Zeki Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. and the other Ottoman Commissioners were due at Mosul to-morrow,
and would reach Passova in four or five days. These officers left without seeing him, and he did
not know what instructions they had got from the Palace or the Minister of War. It was quite
possible they had been told to report against the evacuation of Passova. But they had no papers
with them to prove their case, and when their report came in, his Highness would see to it that
a report was sent to the Sultan establishing beyond doubt the Persian claim to Passova.
“ I pointed out to his Highness that it was his duty not to leave the Sultan in any doubt as
to the grave danger of the course which was guiding his policy for some time past in regard to
this question; that if the Hamidieh regiments once got out ot hand there was no saying how far
disturbances would spread, and that not only was there a strong probability of their extending
to the Bagdad and Bussorah regions, where already there was a good deal of disorder and unrest,
but that they might also take a backward course and set up a revolution in Asia Minor, where
the condition of affairs in the Caucasus was already having its effect. I said that the maintenance
of tranquillity in the regions of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. was a matter ot deep concern to His Majesty’s
Government; that frontier disturbances must necessarily peculiarly affect the Russian Government
at this moment; and that if Turkey provoked by her policy and action a conflagration, the
consequences, however disagreeable to us, might be very serious for turkey.
“His tlighness said I might rely upon his doing all in his power to come to an amicable
arrangement with the Persian Ambassador. He was quite aware of the dangers towards which
their policy in regard to this question was leading . them. His adversaries, however, were
numerous and energetic, and the struggle he was carrying on almost single-handed was rapidly
wearing him out.’’
To Sir N. O’Conor,
No. 108,
Telegraphic,
July 18, 1906.
Sir N. O’Conor,
No. 578,
August 21, 1906.
In July the Hussian Government expressed much anxiety as to the situation, and
Sir M. O’Conor was authorised to renew his representations in concert with his Russian
colleague.
On the 27th July Mr. Grant-Duff reported that the Frontier Commissioners had
met ; but on the 18th August the Persian Government informed him that the Turkish
Commissioner had left for Suliemanieh, and that the Ottoman authorities were collecting
taxes in Mergawar.
Sir N. O'Conor had a consultation with the Russian Chargd d’Affaires as to the
best course to be pursued on the 21st August:—
“M. Svetchine was anxious to elicit from me an expression of opinion as to what we should
do in case the Ottoman Government continued to pursue a policy of aggression. I said that I
was not inclined to think the Sultan would favour a decidedly militant or forward policy,
although I was sceptical as to the Ottoman troops evacuating Passova.
“ I had already warned the Porte that if they provoked a conflagration which extended into
regions where our interests were predominant and very great, we should be obliged seriously to
consider the steps we should take, but that I was rather averse to direct menaces which we were
unlikely to carry into execution so long as the policy of the Porte did not exceed certain limits.
1 said that under present circumstances I thought our best line of policy was to leave the
Ottoman Government in doubt as to what we should do, v/hile losing no opportunity of letting
them see that we were following the question with groat interest, and considered that our
former intervention in the frontier delimitation imposed upon us both rights and obligations
which Ave could not ignore if they pushed matters to extremes. I felt assured from information
that had reached me that our representations and the interest we both showed in the question
had acted as a restraint upon both the Porte and the Sultan, and I thought the best thing Ave
could do was to continue in this line of policy.
“ M. Svetchine said he entirely agreed Avith me, and would report to his Government in the
same sense.”
Sir N. O’Conor,
No. 601,
August 28, 1906.
Mr. Barclay,
No. 196,
Telegraphic,
October 5, 1906.
The Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs stated on the 28th August that it was
absolutely untrue that the Turkish authorities were collecting taxes in Mergawar.
The Turkish Commissioner had only suggested transferring the negotiations to Mosul,
but he had at once been instructed to remain at Passova and to proceed with the joint
deliberations.
The situation continued, however, to show no real improvement, and in the begin
ning of October the Persian Ambassador made the following communicauon to the
British and Russian Representatives at Constantinople