'REPORT on the Working of the Line of Communication AND ON THE Withdrawal of the British Military Mission IN EAST PERSIA, 1919-20. GENERAL STAFF INDIA. [‎11r] (26/168)

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The following Medical Units although in the Directorate of the Assistant
Director, Medical Services, Line of; Communications, came under the adminis
tration of the General Officer Commanding, Malmiss Force :—
Bajgiran ..... Detachment of 178th Indian Combined Field
Ambulance. i
1 Section less detachment at Bajgiran)
Kuchan ..... 17Hh Indian Combined Field Ambul
ance (Malmiss Force.)
Ordnance work in the sections and Sistan Area vas carried out by the
Supply Officer and directed by the Headquarters of the Ordnance Directorate
at Lirjand.
Ill — Military Situation.
Beyond the possibility of a Bolshevik invasion from the North towards
Khorasan and raiding by local tribes in the Southern Section of the Line, the
situation was a peaceful one.
Following the cessation of hostilities with Afghanistan the danger of an
Afghan Invasion towards the Main Line of Communications was considerably
lessened, but precautionary measures to guard against aggression from the East
were never relaxed.
Local frontier tribes required careful watching as a cry of Jehad was
quite sufficient to start them raiding in small parties even if they never collected
in sufficient force to menace our posts of the Line of Communications.
The Afghan situation which had remained normal for a considerable time,
became somewhat acute towards the end of April when information vas
received from India that Afghan Regulars had occupied certain points on the
North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. . This action had instant effect on Western Afghanistan
where local tribes were quickly recruited in Chakansur area with an obvious
threat to our Communications, This combined with the uncertainty of the
situation in Khorasan necessitated a demand for reinforcements from India ;
this demand was all the more imperative as I found that the fighting forces of
of the Line of Communications had been reduced by a whole Battalion of
Infantry and the Kurman Motor Battery since the close of the Afghan War.
The reinforcements were never actually despatched from India but a Battalion
was earmarked in Quetta and was at my disposal had I actually required it.
As a fact I never had occasion to call on this Battalion for, by agreement with
the General Officer Commnding at Meshed by which I was able to detain all
men of the Meshed Troops returning from leave, I was able to build up a
striking force of over 1,000 rifles which was quite sufficient to make the
Southern Section of the Line secure against any probable form of attack.
IV, - Intelligence.
The Question of maintaining an adequate intelligence system during the
occupation of this part of Persia (excluding Meshed) was receiving the most
careful consideration.
Intelligence for which Headquarters was responsible, embracing the collec
tion and dissemination of external and internal information required consider
able organization. It is perhaps undesirable to set forth in detail the methods
adopted in securing information demanded by the needs of this Line of
Communications, but I show briefly the organization in force when 1 arrived
which, I feel sure, proved of value to those with wdiom co-ordination was
maintained and which continued uninterruptedly till the end of the
withdrawal.
2. After the passing of the German Agent danger an entirely new system of
Intelligence had been introduced. The Line of Communications was divided
into Intelligence Areas, the Officer Commanding v usuall y tlie Administrative
Commandant) being responsible for the tract allotted to him. ^ Special
instructions were issued regarding the undesirability of overlapping and
particularly with regard to the proper use of Secret Sei vice Funds. The
Intelligence Areas and general organization pf the Intelligence System are
shown in Appendix (2) to which reference is invited.