'REPORT on the Working of the Line of Communication AND ON THE Withdrawal of the British Military Mission IN EAST PERSIA, 1919-20. GENERAL STAFF INDIA. [‎44v] (95/168)

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II.— Supply and Transport Services.
The withdrawal.
Supplies. —These will be dealt with under the following sub-headings
(a) Initial preparations.
(b) The supply situation at the beginning of the withdrawal.
(c) Terminating contracts.
(d) Estimating surpluses.
(e) Disposal of surpluses :—
(1) Surpluses of services other than the Supply and Transport
Corps.
(2) Backloading.
(3) Disposal of-atta and forage at a valuation to His Britannic
Majesty’s Consul for Sistan.
(4) Sales.
(5) Disposal of unused packing material in Sistan,
(6) Abandonment.
* (/) Supply arrangements at Duzdap,
±nuiai preparations.
For lack of exact data on various points it was impossible, til
late in the period of preparation for the withdrawal, to estimate witl
accuracy the quantity of supplies tha£ had to be maintained at each pos
as a reserve. On a previous occasion, when a withdrawal had beet
mooted, it was estimated that, by increasing the reserve of rations af each pos
from five to eight weeks for the garrison, enough supplies would be available
tor the troops on their way down from Meshed, as well as for the garrison o:
the post itself. It was then fully realised that the lower down the line £
particular post was the more garrisons from other posts it would have to feet
on their way through, but it was held that this extra provision could be made
m 1 . e i on p. r P er i°d that, in their case, was available for making it. The
policy of relying on an eight-weeks’ reserve had, however, been adopted to mee
the possibility of a sudden hurried withdrawal, in which no attempt would be
made to salve surplus stores, and the transport of columns marching down the
a a . Ca t e - W0U1 ? have been COm P ar atively small. When, however, il
nnp Cldea t0 l )r + wi OW ? a lar ^ e fi uautlt y of stores with the troops it wai
at once apparent that the former calculations would not be applicable Foi
CommSinn 'If both from id eshed and from the posts on the Lines oi
increZ the d *n° W b6 com P aratl '' el J' large, and this would not onl 3
lunnlv nn^l.e n^tef fU 6 , reS0U f eS 0 l the lowei ' Posts, but so tax the water
of th/withdra«nl 't 'I' 0 Shusp to Hurmuk that during the process
ot the withdrawal it would be undesirable, if not impossible to send convovs oi
couM* be placed mm IT t0 ShUS P' 14 thus that no See
Hence itw*! 1 P he ? Xt 1 ia time aYailable for replenishing the lower posts
to tbSofal7f^urnbw CUSSi0n t " hat th • exaot P olic ^ was to he with regard
made at tC S in t S t, e % and . a rough shot had to be
thfStrr l.? Sp T 0r "hich the Meshed columns and the surplus and
amount of fora"e to he loirl 6, laes 01 Conimunioation would require, and the
ed factor Itouo-h 3 eac h P ost depended mainly on this undetermin-
the requirements o? e eafh posr’intTtlT th r0UShI? ’ ^ WaS nece8sar . v to a nal y se
the surplus garrison left it eo wt l 0 tbe rec l u > re “ents of the whole post till
reached the next post down the line e i m ^ ments ? f fche surplus garrison till it
posr aown tire line ; (3) the requirements of the four Meshed