'REPORT on the Working of the Line of Communication AND ON THE Withdrawal of the British Military Mission IN EAST PERSIA, 1919-20. GENERAL STAFF INDIA. [‎46r] (98/168)

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(d) Estimating surpluses.
It had not been possible while the preliminary arrangements for the
withdrawal were being made for final conclusions to be arrived at concerning
tbe personnel to be left behind in East Persia and the reserves of rations
required for them. It was therefore somewhat late in the day before it was
known what provision was to be made for the Sistan Levy Corps, and later still
before it was decided that at each post on the main Lines of Communication
a reserve of rations for men and animals was to be left in Levy charge
for use, as required, by the General Officer Commanding, Malmiss Mission.
The decision to leave certain Mechanical Transport details behind for duty
in Meshed and Sistan came last of all, and this also involved a slight
increase in the post-withdrawal feeding strength. However, the margin
allowed in the calculations of the final requirements of each post made
it possible to meet these additional demands. It was also possible to leave
petrol behind for the eventual withdrawal of the Malmiss Mission in the
following approximate quantities. At Turbat 200 gallons, at Jumip 1,000, at
Kain 200, at Birjand 300, Shusp 1,500, Safedawn 1,000, and Hurmuk 3,000.
Allusion has already been made to the difficulty of determining far ahead
what exact quantities of supplies w ould be required for the various columns
and final garrisons. This difficulty, from one cause or another, continued to be
felt till a comparatively late date, and it was of course impossible to inake any
exact estimate of surpluses until “ zero day ” was fixed. It w T as also in no case
desirable in the early stages to part with any apparent supluses of either men’s
rations or of forage at posts where these were drawn from India, since any
check to the withdrawal, if it came while the troops from Meshed were halted
at such a post, would involve there being fed from these surpluses until the
system of replenishment from railhead could be reorganised. It was on this
account deemed a necessary precaution to make each post retain a 20 per cent
reserve in addition to all estimated requirements, until the final garrison trom
the post next above it had actually started on the march. Then and no i
then could this 20 per cent, be regarded as really surplus.
(<?) Disposal of surpluses:
(1) Surpluses of Services other than the Supply and Transport Corps.—
esides disposing of its own surplus supplies and equipment, the Supp!y and
ransport Corps w 7 as also concerned to the following ex en wi ® P * , ,
f other services. It had to arrange transport for the conveyance torailhad of
lose that were not sold, and in one important instance, ie ^ mvey ■
irge consignment to Meshed instead of to railhead. os rmrnose
ere also handed over to the Supply and Transpor 01 1 3 , ^ ^
istead of being sold independently by the Service concerne • ’deD6ts
ase of Ordnance Stores, although orders for disposa weie ^
:om the Ordnance and not from the Supply and Iranspor D rectorat^ t^
xecutive w r ork connected with these devolved upon e. PP y »
lere being no local executive Ordnance Officer aval a e.
(2) i.AWi.j.-BMWoate Zi'ZJ",, without
•itbdrawal, or lifting supplies m pre.erence to ^ The back ,! oaJ i„ g 0 f
srvices, such as the ordnance and the Works f wa s confined
applies was therefore restricted to the lower part of ^ound eith« on spare
3 those supplies for which room ^^kT^he Cent^l tsert that Sere
amels of the final garrisons or on camels of th , rations and 1,100
ot already used up. In this way 7.400 maunds o men s rations i,
aannds of medical comforts were brought down to railheach „ . , ,
(3) Disposal of ala and forage at a valuation ^ msidtrable surpluses
Consul for Ltan-lt eventually became a Pf ^ "f be eft behind
f grain and atta and large supluses of bhoosa ^Id ha^ to ne ^
h the lower half of the line. It had rn fact been ’“P—J the P Bur p luse s
f these articles from Sistan and railhead m a wa y to make
iccruing, and at Shusp it had latterly been possible for onee in way