'Persia. No 1 (1909). Correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, December 1906 to November 1908' [‎44r] (71/236)

the case with Seyed Abdullah. The excitement in the town was intense, and was
exploited for their own purposes by the Atabeg’s personal enemies.
Under these circumstances it was natural that resort should be had to extreme
measures. The conspirators appear to have been in communication with one of the
Secret Societies which abound in Tehran, and to have secured the admittance of some
of their own adherents, wdio provided money and what appeared to be authentic
information from the Court. It was easy to lead the members of the Society
to believe that the destruction of the Atabeg was the only way to save the
country; that he was in corrupt collusion with the Shah, and was about to obtain’
control of the Assembly in order to carry through another foreign loan with the active
help of the President. Orders were given to remove him, and the deed was carried out
on the very day when, as it appeared, his success was complete.
Popular sentiment approved the murder, and the assassins were regarded as
saviours of their country. The streets of Tabreez were illuminated.
The result of the Atabeg’s murder is for the time to disorganize the whole system
of government.
As yet popular opinion seems united as to the justice of the Atabeg’s “ execution,”
and it is quite evident that there is now in Persia an intense feeling of patriotism and a
resolve to destroy any Persian suspected of a design to sell his country, which never
existed before and which is a new element in Persian life. It may have been possible to
make use of this sentiment in order to secure the removal of a prominent statesman, but
it must now be evident to all that no statesman can disregard it with impunity,
No. 43.
Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey,-—{Received September 30.)
Gulahek, September 13, 1907.
THE situation here has grown worse. The death of the Atabeg has increased
the general disorganization of the country.
Ispahan is in the possession of the great priests, who^ exploit the people and
threaten foreigners. The road between Ispahan and Kum is occupied by an aimed
body of Bakhtiaris, who rob posts and caravaos, maltreat travellers, and have
practically put a stop to trade on the road to the capital. JChe Bakhtiaris have shown
a marked disregard of the authority of the Government. The Englishmen employed by
the D’Arcy Syndicate are in a position which is described by Captain Lorirner as one of
great danger. t> -j.- i i rn
No attempt is being made to pay the interest due on the British loan, lire
proceeds of the Bushire customs are diverted by the Government. ^ Even the
Kermanshah customs, which were at first devoted to the payment of this claim, aie
now paid into the bank with great irregularity. The Government has no available
funds except the customs revenue, as the provincial taxes are not being paid ; The
Shah is hardly able to meet his own personal expenses, and his servants are continually
on strike. . , ^ 1 , . , , .
A deputation recently called on the Mushir-ed-Dowleh and asked him to take
office. He refused unless he was provided with money. He said that he would not
take the dangerous responsibility of accepting a foreign loan, and that unless the
Persian people supplied the funds necessary to carry on the Government, or consented
to the Government finding funds elsewhere, all government would be shoitly
'Ptigj'g Jg ]}o sign of an agreement netween the Shah and the Assembly, "without
which the chaotic "state of affairs must continue. The political Committees, who
really rule the country, have a profound distrust for the Shah and his Mmisteis, and
the Shah is known to be animated by a strong aversion for the new Constitution and
the Assembly.
British interests are likely to suffer from a continuance of the piesent state of
" It is not impossible that a new Cabinet may be formed on a popular basis which
will be strong enough to enforce order and collect taxes. It would, I think be
advisable to await events, for a time at any rate. If no improvement takes place before
the spring, the Powers mainly interested will have to take measures to protect then-
interests if they are thought of sufficient importance to warrant the necessary measures,
[1072] ^ ^