'Persia. No 1 (1909). Correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, December 1906 to November 1908' [‎88r] (159/236)

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139
T No. 175. ’ >
Mi'. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)
(Extract.) Gulahek, June 17, 19C8.
IT is not easy to explain all the causes or, perhaps it would be more correct
to say, to assign their relative importance to the various causes of the crisis which
has agitated Persia, and especially the capital, for some days at the end of May and
beginning of June.
Since the 16th ultimo the country has been without a Cabinet. The disappearance
from the Foreign Office of Mushir-ed Dowleh is regretted by no one. His wretched
weakness resulted in a fresh outburst of popular wrath against the Shah, and a
formidable agitation was started, demanding that His Majesty should dismiss from
his service Amir Behadur Jang and others of his most trusted courtiers, who for
that very reason are particularly obnoxious to the popular party.
Late on Tuesday afternoon (the 2nd instant) the Shah yielded to the popular
demands, and agreed to dismiss six of his entourage. Between 2 and 3 the next
morning Amir Bahadur Jang, accompanied by some twenty of his armed gholams,
arrived at the Bussian Legation at Zergendeh.
The following morning, the 3rd instant, I received a visit from the Bussian
Minister. M. de Hartwig said he was anxious about the Shah’s safety, while
His Majesty looked on himself as practically a doomed man; he thought the
position so serious that the two Legations ought to take some step. He suggested,
therefore, that we should call together on Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who, though he had
resigned office five days before, was still acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and
point out to him the grave consequences which might ensue to Persia should anything
happen to the Shah. I said I was quite willing to join him, but I did not think
much would be gained by speaking to Mushir-ed-Dowleh alone, for he would probably
give a very imperfect account of our representations, and 1 suggested that we
might ask his Excellency to invite the President of the Assembly to meet us.
M. de Hartwig agreed, and proposed that as Momtaz-ed-Dowleh was not much more
dependable than the Minister for Foreign AMairs, the presence of Azad-ul-Mulk would
be desirable.
We accordingly telegraphed to Mushir-ed-Dowleh, inviting him to arrange a
meeting for 3*30 that afternoon. ' ■
On reaching Mushir-ed-Dowleh’s house I found M. de Hartwig already there, but
Momtaz-ed-Dowleh and Azad-ul-Mulk had both excused themselves on rather flimsy
pretexts, M. de Hartwig opened the conversation by pointing out to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs that we had come, as the Bepresentatives of the two Powers which are
most concerned in Persia’s well-being, to point out the dangerous way in which Persia
was being allowed to drift towards anarchy. This was a very grave prospect, and he
hoped that Mushir-ed-Dowleh would make it his business to warn his colleagues and the
Assembly in the most serious way of their position.
Following M. de Hartwig, I said that I was quite in agreement with his view of
Persia’s present situation. I thought that the real remedy lay in trying to create a
better feeling between the Shah and his people, and in trying to remove the distrust
which was generally entertained of His Majesty. Unfortunately, no one seemed to
have the courage to lift up a voice in defence of him. The Medjliss was not a very
enlightened body, and its ideas, on financial questions, for instance, were quite
childish ; yet no one attempted to correct them, and it w T as just the same where
the Anjumans and Shah were concerned. The most palpably improbable stories were
circulated to the Shah’s discredit, and were eagerly swallowed down by an ignorant and
prejudiced mob, simply because no one in authority took the trouble to contradict
them.
Mushir-ed-Dowleh promised to represent faithfully what we had said to his
colleagues and to the Assembly.
On taking leave, M. de Hartwig said he thought Mushir-ed-Dowleh would probably
not give a very accurate account of what we had wished to convey, and it would be
prudent that we should call on Azad-ul-Mulk to make a similar statement to him.
Having an appointment with Mr. Babino, I was unable to proceed at once to Azad-ul-
Mulk’s house, but I followed M. de Hartwig there as soon as possible, and w~e spoke to
him very much in the same strain as to Mushir-ed-Dowletn
1 have reason to believe that Mushir-ed-Dowleh did inform the President of the
Assembly accurately of the purport of our visit, and I took steps to let it be knoYm to