'Persia. No 1 (1909). Correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, December 1906 to November 1908' [‎96r] (175/236)

pourparlers passed between the Ministers and the Assembly on the one hand, and the
Court at Bagh-i-Shah on the other.
Debate on the demands put forward by the Court was very prolonged, and the
Medjliss sat till a late hour before they were finally rejected. There seems to be little
doubt that this result had been foreseen at Bagh-i-Shah, for ample preparations must
have been made for the operations of the following day.
The accounts of the events of Tuesday, the 23rd June, are even more conflicting
than usual in Persia.
They concur in asserting that the leaders, and in particular Seyyid Abdullah,
had enjoined on the party to act strictly on the defensive, and that the first shot
was fired by a soldier, possibly in the air, and that it was only after this that the
Enjumens fired on the troops. The point, however, is of little real importance, as it
was clear that the Shah had decided to appeal to force. _
I think there can be little doubt that the Russian officers were purposely never
fired on. Persians all say that special injunctions were issued to^ that effect, and
‘M. de Hartwig volunteered to me the statement that such was the impression of one
Russian officer. Were it otherwise it seems incredible, considering the short range and
excellent cover which the popular party enjoyed, that they should have escaped. All,
moreover, exposed themselves fearlessly throughout the day, and a Persian Deputy has
told me that Colonel Liakhoff* in particular could have been killed at almost any
moment. Had they been killed I think it unquestionable that the struggle would have
ended quite differently; but they owed their lives to the general conviction that their
death would bring about Russian intervention. As it was they succeded in keeping
their men on the whole under wonderfully good restraint, for very few shops and
scarcely any private houses, except those marked down for plunder, i.e., those of
Zil-es-Sultan and Banou Ozma, were touched, and they undoubtedly prevented the
Persian regiment of Silakhoris and Amir Behadur Jangs guard from committing the
grossest excesses. t #
I received the first news of the struggle going on in Tehran rather belore 7
and a couple of hours later went across to Zerguendeh to see M. de Hartwig, who had,
he said, received much the same news as myself, but argued that till we knew wit
more certainty what was going on we could not decide what to do. I called again at
12, and he agreed to send our dragomans down to Tehran to point out to the Shah the
danger in which Europeans were placed. When I called, about 3 he agreed that, in
addition to urging that steps should be taken for the maintenance of security dm mg
the night, our dragomans should remind the Shah of his assurances to lespect the
Constitution. . . .. .
M. de Hartwig sent to summon M. Baranowsky to give him his instructions, ana
told him what we had agreed on. I told M. de Hartwig that I should give Mr. Ghurc n
written instructions. M. de Hartwig agreed that Mr. Churchill and M. Baranowsky
should meet at His Majesty’s Legation at 5 r.M. M. Baranowsky did not, however, put
in an appearance till close on 6 o’clock. .
On the way from the Legation to Bagh-i-Shah Mr. Churchill showed the instruc
tions I had given him to M. Baranowsky, who, as representing the senior Mission, was
to act as spokesman, and who gave a faithful translation to the Shah. His Impel la
Majesty gave every promise that no pillaging or disorders should take place, and
orders were given also for the protection of the Imperial Bank of Persia and of the
Indo-European Telegraph Department’s quarters, and for the safe escort of the cleiks
going to and from the Central Office on duty. _ .
I inclose a memorandum by Mr. Churchill, giving an account of the audience at
^ Soon after receiving news of the events in town I sent Major Stokes to town with
instructions to see that no one should take refuge in the Legation unless m imminent
danger of his life, and from time to time he sent me telephone messages of what was
happening. His reports showed that a good deal of looting must be going on, as he
saw soldiers, both of the Cossack Brigade and the Persian Silakhor Regiment,
returning in the direction of Bagh-i-Shah laden with plunder of the most varied
description, even the gun-carriages being piled high with booty, while, at a moment
when he was actually using the telephone of a shop within a few yards of the Legation
gates four men of Amir Behadur’s guard attempted to enter for purposes of plunder.
As a matter of fact, however, comparatively few shops and private houses were
pillaged, and most of the loot came from the huge Palace of Zil-es-Sultan and from t e
Medpiss building. The exterior of the former suffered but little, for Dr. Neligan, who,
went into Tehran to offer his services to the wounded, passed the gate, and though