'Persia. No 1 (1909). Correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, December 1906 to November 1908' [‎115r] (213/236)

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of the followers of Sat tar Khan • another reason for the step is that Sattar Khan
refuses to guaiantec that the Ifussians in labreez are any longer safe. Tire destruction
of the post station was, it appears, the work both of' the Shah’s men and of the
Nationalists. The Royalist troops had, according to M. Tcharykoff, been completely
defeated.
*3
No. 268,
Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey,—{Received October 18.)
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, October 18. 1908.
RUSSIAN Cossacks forTabreez. Your telegram of the 17th instant.
M. Tcharykoff, with whom I had to-day a long conversation, read me out various
telegrams which had been exchanged between him and M. de Hartwig. The looting
and destruction of Russian property at the post station were, so his Excellency
explained to me, the work of the anti-Royalists, and not, as I had understood yesterday,
the combined work of them and of the Shah’s forces. The lives of the Russian
subjects in Tabreez were, he asserted, in peril, as were also the Russian institutions
established there—the Consulate, bank, &c., and there was at present at Tabreez no
proper security. The force to be sent was the minimum possible, he added.
Proclamations would be issued everywhere, on its departure from Julfa, that it was on
its way to Tabreez simply with the object of giving protection to Russian subjects and
institutions, should it be required. M. Tcharykoff said that most stringent instructions
would be issued that the force was to undertake no kind of interference in Persian
internal affairs; as soon as some guarantee was afforded that security existed, it would
be recalled.
M. Tcharykoff assured me most categorically, when I spoke to him in the sense
of your above-mentioned telegram, that, if the objects of the step taken by the Govern
ment were regarded in such a manner, these views were entirely opposed to the facts
of the case. It was impossible for the Russian Government to wait till the murder of
some Russians had occurred, and much more serious measures would have to be taken
if such an event as that took place. His Excellency asserted that the measures now
being taken by the Russian Government were simply precautionary in character, and
he added that he felt sure that in the event of a like case arising in the south of
Persia the same measures would be adopted in similar circumstances by His Majesty’s
Government. Not the slightest desire nor intention existed on the part of the Russian
Government to intervene in Persian internal matters; it was indifferent to them by
whom security at Tabreez was established, as long as it was established. The idea of
their wanting to re-establish the authority of the Shah or crush the Nationalist party
was out of the question. I told his Excellency that I did not give these views as the
opinions of His Majesty’s Government, but I said that they might be held in many
quarters in England. M. Tcharykoff replied that he earnestly hoped that His
Majesty’s Government would do all in their power to remove misconceptions of this
nature, and to represent in its real and true light the step taken by the Russian
Government as being a reinforcement of the Consular guards for the protection in a
time of danger of Russian subjects and institutions. There were, his Excellency
added, from 300 to 500 revolutionaries from the Caucasus in Sattar Khan’s force, and
great mischief was caused by them. In reply to my inquiry as to why they were not
kept at home by the Russian authorities, his Excellency said that to guard a
long and mountainous frontier was an impossibility. The limited object of the dispatch
of the force, as well as the fact that there is no intention to intervene or interfere
in Persian internal affairs, will be announced here in the “ Official Gazette.” His
Excellency gave an affirmative reply to my question as to whether his Consul-General
at Tabreez really held the danger to be serious and imminent. To induce the Russian
Government to revise their decision would, I think, be impossible. They seem
convinced that they w r ould incur grave responsibility if they ignored the danger, of
the existence of which they appear sure.