Coll 28/28A ‘Persia: Perso-Baluchistan frontier; demarcation near Mirjawa [mostly copies of papers on 28/28]’ [‎228r] (455/572)

(This Document is the P rope rty of His B ritannic Majesty s Government.j
If. I 1 ]
PliKSl
OON Ft I) KNT1AI..
4 JUNTO
■4^1-
[June 5.]
8>otiov 2.
No. 1. ^
Sir A. Hardinge to the Mur guess of Lansdowne. — (Receiv'd June 5.)
(No. 102.)
My Lord. Tehran, May 15, 190c.
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in continuation of my telegram
No. 65 of the 13th instant, a copy of the Agreement which I signed that day with the
Mushir-ed-Dowleh, respecting the frontier at Mirjawar and the supply of provisions
from Mirjawar, Ladis, and Seistan to the British outposts in North-A\ estern
Baluchistan.
The Article about the frontier is very brief. I had, in my original draft, inserted
a clause defining the position of Padaha as situated on the Indian side of the
boundary claimed by Persia,’ but, as the Mushir-ed-Dowleh said the Shah did not
know exactly where Padaha was, and had made no claim in relation to it, I thought
it advisanle, in view of the uncertainty" of our own right to it, not to draw too much
attention to this point. I contented myself, therefore, with a recognition of out
possession of it, and with the insertion of the provision—on which stress is laid in tba
Viceroy’s telegram of the 27th February—that the question of the frontier in that
region should now be deemed settled, and no further claim be made respecting it.
The clause about our garrison at Padaha using “ buckets or waterskins^ to draw
water from the tank at Mirjawar is, I need hardly say. of Persian origin. Ihe object
of the Persian Government seems to have been to prevent our trying to claim a right
to bring water by means of a “kanat,’’ or artiiicial channel, from Mirjawar to Padaha.
I accepted it to please the Persians, though it reads rather grotesquely in a solemn
diplomatic instrument.
The total annual amount of grain obtained by me for our Indian frontier stations
is, as your Lordship will observe, 2,200 Tabreez “ kharwars, or 200 more than
the figure suggested by Colonel MacMahon it it should prove impossible to persuade*
the Persian Government to remove the embargo altogether. I made* great efforts
in this direction, and induced M. Naus to speak very strongly to the Ain-ed-Dowleh
in support of mv representations, but his Highness, though lie relented a little and
admitted that M. Naus was right in principle, said the embargo was an asset in the
hands of the Persian Government, and should not be lightly given away. The
concluding passage about customs duties and the non-export of grain from localities
actually suffering from famine was insisted on by the Persians, but 1 insisted, on my
side, on its being made clear that the harvest must lx* shown not merely to be
threatened by inadequate rain, but to have been actually destroyed by locusts, blight,
or some other exceptional visitation (such as a raid, a flood, or some such abnormal
phenomenon), since otherwise the Governors would always pretend that there was a
scarcity, so as to get the embargo put on and make money out of bribes paid to them
by smugglers. . .
I pointed out, and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh quite agreed, that these illicit gains by
the local Governors were of no benefit to the Persian Government, and that it was
high time to put a stop to them. I told his Excellency, at the same time, that the
additions proposed by him in consequence of orders received from the Shah’s camp
about customs and destruction of the crops, had not been submitted to your Lordship,
and that though I thought you would accept them, 1 must make a formal reservation
which would enable you, should you not approve of them, to withhold your assent to
the arrangement in its present form, and I handed to him, before signing the Agree
ment, the note of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith
1 should mention that we had arrived at a complete understanding on the
7th instant, the day on which the Shah left Tehran, and I was ready to sign next
day, but the Mushir-cd-Dowleh insisted on sending the text ol the Agreement to the
Boyal camp at Kerej for the Shah’s approval, and as the Court was on the move, it
was not till the 13th instant that his Excellency was able to obtain an answer to a
telegram which I had pressed him to dispatch on the subject.
^Meanwhile, Colonel MacMahon had telegraphed that he wanted to start not Inter
than the 15th instant, and 1 therefore thought myself justified, in view of your
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