Coll 6/69 'Affairs in the Yemen.' [‎30r] (59/78)

g)
a.
The Qadhi’s future Is most uncertain and he would be
the first to realise this* He is universally feared, loathed
and detested by all the Imam’s sons and all important Yemenis;
he is at loggerheads with the powerful Wazir Minister. family who,
together with their satellites, govern more than a third of the
Yemen* The "Crown Prince” who is, incidentally, also anti-
Wazir Minister. has sworn to reiK>ve and disgrace the Qadhi if and when he
has the power, though I will add in parenthesis that he
( Amri) may prove too able for him to crush for the reasons
stated in paragraph 3 above. In any event Qadhi Abdullah
must be astute enough to know that his future is not only
insecure but highly dangerous as well, so what is he to do? He
is up against everybody In the Yemen; all of his lines of
retreat seem to end in blind alleys unless he can placate the
future Imam, but, as it is impossible to forecast the Imandc
Succession, what can he hope for? (I think incidentally that
he has been trying to flirt with the Wasirs through Qadhi
Hussein ; 1 Balali - Governor of Huieria in the district
subordinate to Seiyid All ibn Al Wasir, who is Governor-
General and Commander-in-Chief of the Ta'iz Liwa - a Son* a
evidence in support of this)* In the circumstances I am
compelled to think that he hat? decided the Italians are hie
only salvation if they have ulterior motives in the Yemen*
9. I am sure in all fairness to him that the thought
of Intimate collaboration with the Italians is distasteful to
him but it is equally certain that he is engaged in polemics
which concern his life and future. As a pious and fanatical
Moslem he would think nothing of spending the Italian 11 res
which came hie way and as a politician I think he has earned
his pay in small ways, e*g* passing on tit bits of
information (I am reliably informed for instance that he
cltiaen, who is a personal friend of his but I have no
recently