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Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎17r] (33/248)

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The record is made up of 1 file (122 folios). It was created in 21 Jun 1942-15 Mar 1946. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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3
[68—110] B 2
at Kermanshah—an allegation which had a nucleus of truth in the seasonal
transfer of troops to the Kermanshah area from Iraq to escape the hot weather.
9. The more the question was studied the sharper seemed the unfortunate
contrast between our good intentions hampered by the exigencies of the war with
Japan and the obvious intention of the Russians to keep a hold on Persia for as
long as possible in spite of the fact that this was justified by no military neces-
sity whatsoever. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and the General Officer
* - Commanding-in-Chief, Paiforce, considered that so long as the war with Japan
H went on, troops must be kept in the Kermanshah area—the only suitable place in
the Middle East with a good climate; and this involves retention of the camp
„ j at Bisitun—twenty miles nearer to Tehran than the nearest point allowed to us
when the military zones were defined with the Russians in 1941.
10. A curious misunderstanding had to be cleared up, viz., that the proposal
for the withdrawal of troops was a policy of appeasement—a feeble attempt to
conciliate the Russians. The right policy, it was suggested by the holders of this
view, was to tell the Russians that we needed to stay in Persia because we were
at war with Japan : the Russians always understood a bold front and would
respect us. It was explained in reply that this “ bold ” policy would delight the
Russians, because the more of Persia we occupied, the easier it would be for them
to justify the retention of Soviet troops; and that our aim, far from being a
policy of appeasement, was to use against the Russians the only weapon in our
hands—that of exposure of their “ imperialist ” tendencies, if they refused to
make any substantial withdrawal by making the facts public. This we considered
would explode Russia’s claim to be the protector of small nations, both in the
minds of the Persian public (where it finds little credence even now) and in
foreign countries, especially in the United Kingdom and the Tnited States.
11. It is realised that Tehran could not be evacuated in a few days. There
are complications, such as a saw-mill run by British military labour which is
essential for the erection of quarters for troops at the base, and the military party
which is making a ground survey of the Ear Valley on behalf of a British
firm which is seeking a contract for building a big dam. In all such cases the
question is whether, if military personnel was left, either in uniform or in civilian
clothes, the Soviet Government would claim it as a proof of continued retention
of British troops in Tehran and as an excuse for staying there themselves. The
Royal Air Force, too, have interests which could not be abandoned at a month’s
1 " notice. They would have to shuffle off their responsibilities for the Doshan
Tappeh aircraft factory An East India Company trading post. and, if the British Overseas Airways Corporation were
still running their service to Tehran, alternative arrangements for airfield control,
meteorological service and signals would have to be made. It seems to His
Majesty’s Embassy that every day the Russians strengthen their grip on the
north of Persia, and that, consequently, the necessity for the evacuation of at
least Tehran with the minimum of delay grows more obvious; and if His Majesty’s
Government decide for the evacuation of Tehran the difficulties must be attacked
from all sides with the greatest vigour, whereupon some obstacles which at present
appear large may shrink in size.
12. The problem can now be summed up thus :—
(1) It will presumably be proposed at Potsdam that we and the Russians
should begin the pari passu evacuation of our troops forthwith,
commencing with Tehran.
(2) We shall not be embarrassed by the stationing of British troops at
Hamadan.
(3) We shall, however, be embarrassed if it is considered essential to retain
troops at Kermanshah-Bisitun after the autumn, since it seems quite
certain that the Russians would then wish to retain troops along the
Tabriz-Qazvin-Tehran-Semnan-Meshed line, thereby prolonging the
paralysis of the capital which serves their political schemes so well.
An alternative suggestion made by the embassy was to keep the mobile
reserve in a tented camp at Karind, which is only just inside the
Persian border, or better still (if there is no suitable place in Iraq) in
** Palestine. If troops could be brought by air to Abadan or the oil
fields from Palestine in case of emergency, they should arrive as
quickly as troops from Kermanshah could arrive by other means. The
* * question whether the airfields in the oil-wells area were or could be
' made adequate to receive airborne troops remained to be examined.
(4) An important factor is that dealt with in paragraph 30 of the March
quarterly report, whether the security of the oil area could be assured

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Content

This file consists of miscellaneous dispatches relating to internal affairs in Persia [Iran] during the occupation of the country by British and Soviet troops. The file begins with references to an Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of Alliance, signed in January 1942, which followed the Anglo-Soviet invasion of the country in August-September 1941.

Most of the dispatches are addressed by His Majesty's Minister (later Ambassador) at Tehran (Sir Reader William Bullard) to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Anthony Eden). The dispatches discuss political, financial and economic affairs in Persia, as well as issues regarding road and rail transport (for the transportation of foodstuffs), food supplies and press censorship,

Related matters of discussion include the following:

  • British concerns regarding the extent and effect of Axis propaganda in Persia and the Persian Government's response to it.
  • Relations between the Shah [Muhammad Reza Khan] and successive Persian prime ministers, and the power and influence of the Majlis deputies.
  • Anglo-Persian relations, and British concerns regarding Soviet policy in Persia.
  • The Persian press's response to the Allied occupation.
  • The Tehran conference in late November 1943, attended by Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Franklin D Roosevelt, who were also present at a dinner at the British Legation, held in celebration of Churchill's 69th birthday (also discussed is the naming of three streets in Tehran, after Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt respectively).
  • The tribal situation in Persia.
  • The raising of the status of the British Legation in Tehran to that of British Embassy in February 1943.
  • The United States' interests in Persia.
  • The status of Polish evacuees in Persia.
  • The work of the British Council in Persia.
  • The question of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia.

The file includes a divider which gives a list of correspondence references contained in the file by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence (folio 1).

Extent and format
1 file (122 folios)
Arrangement

The papers are arranged in approximate chronological order from the rear to the front of the file.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence for this description commences at the front cover with 1, and terminates at the inside back cover with 124; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio.

Written in
English in Latin script
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Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎17r] (33/248), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/12/564, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100042321849.0x000022> [accessed 29 March 2024]

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