Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎33r] (65/248)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
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February 7, 1945.
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Section 1.
4
Copy No.
Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.-^{Received 1th February.) G^Sid. ^
(No. 21.) . r
Tehran, 2Zrd January, 1945.
WITH reference to my despatch No. 401 of the I8th October, I have the
honour to convey to you herein a report on Persian affairs during the months ox
October, November and December, 1944.
Internal Politics and the Oil Dispute with the Soviet Union.
2. At the beginning of October Sa id’s Cabinet continued to enjoy tne
support of the majority in the Majlis. The three fractions, the Mihan, the Azadi
and the Ittahadi Millp which towards the end of August had combined to form a
Government majority, still continued to hold together, although there were signs
of disintegration in the largest group, the Azadi. I he Majlis was busy discussing
a Bill for the Independence of the Judiciary, which was also the subject of many
articles in the press. The Government and Millspaugh were studying the problem
of unemployment arising out of the dismissal of workmen hitherto employed by
the Allies. ' On the 1st October article 12 of the Compulsory Education Bill, pro
viding for an increase in teachers’ salaries, for an expansion in the provision of
school buildings, and for special courses for workmen, was approved by the
Majlis. Steps taken by Sururi, the Minister of the Interior, to remove the worst
criminals out of Tehran to prisons in the south were approved in the press and
public opinion. Gholam Hussain Ibtehaj, the chief of the municipality, made a
good start by dealing successfully with a strike among municipal workers. A
slight temporary drop in the cost of living also had a good effect. Efforts to enlist
the support of the press for the Government took the form of frequent invitations
by Ministers to press representatives to meetings, at which the former explained
the activities of their departments. As a result, the Government was free, for a
brief period, from the usual violent attacks in the press.
3. These events were, however, soon overshadowed by a Russian demand for
an oil concession in North Persia. Kavtaradze, Soviet Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, who had been in Persia for about two weeks, had informed the Shah on
the 1st October that the Soviet Government sought permission to explore for oil
over almost the whole of North Persia during a period of five years, after which
they would indicate the areas they wished to exploit (the exact figures for the
exploration area were 216,000 square kilometres and for the concession area a
maximum of 150,000 square kilometres). Kavtaradze further informed His
Majesty that he had already approached the Persian Government, whom he found
slow to move, and intimated that the Russian Government were not satisfied with
Soviet-Persian relations and that the future of Russo-Persian economic relations
might depend on the Persian reply to the Russian demand.
4. The news that the Russians were seeking an oil concession was given to
the public on the 5th October, when the newspaper Ittila’at published an inter
view on the subject with Kavtaradze. Much anxiety had for some time been felt
by Persians in Tehran at Soviet penetration in North Persia. The news that they
now wanted an extensive oil concession caused widespread alarm, and the con
troversy it aroused in Persian political circles put other issues into the background
for the rest of the year.
5. The Russians immediately began pulling all possible wires to influence
Persian opinion and were supported by a section of the press. The Shah, how
ever, informed His Majesty’s Ambassador on the 8th October that the Russian
demand for oil rights in the north would be refused, and a few days later Sa'id
informed Kavtaradze that the Government had decided early in September to
postpone until after the war the question of granting oil concessions. This
decision was most unwelcome to Kavtaradze. who said that there might be
unpleasant consequences, while acceptance would be most advantageous to the
Persian Government, who would enjoy, among other things, the support of the
Soviet Government at the Peace Conference. There was little doubt, however,
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