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! in Persian circles is that on the withdrawal of Russian troops the Kurds will
: be incited to launch out on a campaign of pillaging which the Persian authorities
j will be unable to suppress; the people of Azerbaijan will then appeal to the
Soviet Government to come to their protection. So that they can play their part
in this plan, the Kurds must be protected against Persian attempts to subdue or
disarm them.
40. The alleged movement for Kurdish independence is reported to be
directed, as far as Persian Kurdestan is concerned, by a Kurdish notable, Qazi
Muhammad of Mahabad. He is supposed to be in alliance with Hama Rashid
of Baneh, and both are reported to have received visits from Soviet officials.
Hama Rashid was in rebellion against the Persian Government in 1942 and was
successful in wresting from them a settlement which left him in effective control
of the Baneh district, with no semblance of Persian authority, and with a
subsidy nominally for the maintenance of order. For some time past some
Persian authorities have held the view that the autonomous position secured by
Hama Rashid was a dangerous encouragement to Kurdish aspirations; and they
have been considering the advisability of establishing, by force if necessary, an
administration in Baneh with some outward evidence of Persian Government
authority. My advice was that any such measure should be preceded or accom
panied by an announcement of Government policy and some concrete evidence
of an intention to provide some benefits to the Kurdish tribes. Hama Rashid,
however, played into the hands of the Persian General Staff, who were the
principal advocates of a forward policy, by attacking the village of Merivan, the
headquarters of another Kurdish chief whom the Persian Government had
voluntarily put into a position similar to that occupied by Hama Rashid at
Baneh. The Persian Government accepted the view that this was a direct
challenge to their authority, and they ordered the despatch of a column to expel
Hama Rashid’s followers from Merivan. This has been accomplished with little
or no opposition. At the end of the period under review operations were being
initiated for the occupation of Baneh, though there are Persians in and outside
the Government who are averse from provoking the Kurds at present.
Persian Land Forces.
41. The army has made little progress. There is perhaps a slight improve
ment in morale, due to a few minor operations having been carried out without
disaster, and corruption and embezzlement are less in evidence. The Govern
ment has not as yet decided on a policy as regards its forces, and the size of both
the army and gendarmerie is considerably above what can be efficiently main
tained on the funds available. In both forces there is much discontent and
among the better officers a feeling of despair and of disappointment at the failure
of the American advisers to effect any lasting reforms General Ridley now takes
a very restricted view of the scope of his mission, much narrower than he is
authorised to do by the terms of his engagement. His influence is less and less
in evidence. The activities of his mission are now limited to matters of
transport, of supply and to giving unheeded advice about the medical services.
His scheme for the centralised training of recruits has been abandoned after a
limited and unhappy trial. He says that his task, which he now interprets as
little more than the organisation of systems of supply, transport and accounting,
will be finished in a few months. If, however, he could be persuaded that his
task is not only to inaugurate a system but to remain long enough to see it firmly
established, the effect would, I feel sure, be quickly evident.
42. The forceful personality of General Razinara, the Chief of the Staff, in
contrast with the inertia of the Government is pushing the army into greater
prominence in the affairs of the provinces, particularly in tribal areas. He is
shamelessly filling all important appointments with his own friends; his self-
confidence and his ambition increase, but he is, I think genuinely, anxious to
co-operate with us for the present.
43. Colonel Schwarzkopf continues to work with great energy, and
regrettably little visible result. Encouraged by some Deputies and other
influential persons who would like to see the gendarmerie established in a more
important position than the army, he aims at an organisation which he estimates
would require three years to build up and whose cost would be justifiable only if
the army were reduced to a small striking force. However desirable that might
be, it does not seem to be realisable in the near future; and it is the efficiency of
the gendarmerie in the near future that is of primary interest to us. Towards
that very little progress is evident. But it is reasonable to expect that Colonel
*
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A.