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assume real power, put the Majlis and the Shah in their proper places and tackle
urgent problems such as the stabilisation of prices and the supply of bread,
instead of struggling with political intrigues.
5. Meanwhile the new Minister of the Interior, Farajullah Bahramy, was
the cause of a fresh crisis between the Prime Minister and the Shah. On the"
2nd February he had taken two of the new American advisers to an audience
with the Shah. On coming out of the room, he found the Prime Minister waiting
for him in a furious temper. Qawam es Sultaneh reproved him sharply for going
direct to the Shah without informing his chief, and told the Minister that he
should resign. Bahramy replied very impertinently, saying he would not resign :
it was for the Prime Minister to resign. The Prime Minister then went to the
Shah and offered to resign if Farajullah Bahramy did not, but the Shah refused
to accept the resignation of either. The net result was to increase the coolness
which had existed for so long between the Shah and the Qawam, and it was
evident that the Court hoped that the Prime Minister would soon fall and be
replaced by Sa’ed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. A further cause of friction
arose out of a remark made to the Shah by the Minister-designate for Portugal
(Javad Sineki) during his farewell audience : Sineki had suggested to the Shah
that His Majesty should take a direct and personal interest in appointments made
to foreign posts : this reached the ears of the Prime Minister, who. according
to the Court, twisted the story round and made it appear that the Shah was once
more endeavouring to interfere in the adminisration of the country.
6. Meanwhile the Majlis, on the 4th February, endeavoured by a snatch-
vote to make the appointment of head of the National Bank dependent on the vote
of the Majlis, the effect of which would be to remove from the post Abul Hassan
Ebtehaj. who had only recently been selected for that position by the Qawam—an
appointment which was regarded as extremely suitable by almost all responsible
persons in Tehran. As Ebtehaj, although intensely nationalistic, is believed to
be friendly to us, the action of the Majlis was to some extent an attack on us, as
well as on the Prime Minister. The Shah spoke once more of dismissing the
Majlis, provided that he could obtain a Prime Minister whom he could trust,
and sounded me on the subject of the return of Taqi-Zadeh and of the appoint
ment of Ali Mansour to the post of Prime Minister if Taqi-Zadeh could not
come. My Soviet colleague and I endeavoured to settle the quarrel between Qawam
and the Minister of the Interior, without success.
7. On the 7th February the Prime Minister succeeded in obtaining a vote
of confidence of 65 votes to 42 from the Majlis. This somewhat surprising result
was secured partly by the Prime Minister’s acceptance of the Bill concerning the
head of the National Bank, and partly by political manipulation and promises
of favours to the Majlis Deputies. Qawam was always inclined to regard success
in political manoeuvre as more important than good administration : on the other
hand, since he was opposed by the Shah and had little support from the people,
it was natural that he should try to win over the Majlis. He made a long speech ’
in the Majlis on the 10th February which amounted to an emphatic assertion
of the Prime Minister’s duty of administering the affairs of the country without
interference by the Shah. He continued to press for the adoption of his Bill to
enable Deputies to become Cabinet Ministers without a three months’ wait. To
support his plea he quoted article 32 of the Annex to the Constitution, which
reads : “ If a Deputy applies for a post in any Government organism, his parlia
mentary functions thereby lapse, and he can only take part in the business of
the Majlis if he resigns the post in question and is re-elected for some electoral
constituency.” This article, argued the Prime Minster, had hitherto been held
to include candidates for positions in the Cabinet, whereas he maintained that it
meant only civil service posts. He stated in the course of his speech that the laws
passed during the late despotic regime had not been in accordance with the spirit
of democracy and that the next Legislature might do well to revise even the
Constitution. His appeal had little effect on the Deputies, while the Shah
professed to detect the most sinister designs in the reference to a revision of the
Constitution. The Prime Minister went on with his attempts to complete his
Cabinet, and hoped on the 11th February to persuade Soheily, Hikmat and Bader
to join the Government. On the following day, however, they refused his
proposal, and the weary Prime Minister attributed their refusal to Court
intrigues. The Soviet Ambassador did his best to help the Qawam, and even sent
a message to Tadayyun to the effect that the Soviet Government no longer had
any objection to his joining the Government.