'File 5/2 I Kuwait Neutral Zone' [‎57r] (118/474)

3*)
3.
Mr. Fraser would of course understand that it should he
kept confidential. He suggested that if the Standard Oil
Company agreed to a concession on the terms already proposed
by Ydlibi when these terms were shown to them by the Saudi
Government it might be that the Saudi Government would not be
prevented by the option given to the Standard Oil from
approaching Ydlibi again in the hopes of persuading him to
improve on his previous offer. Mr. Fraser on the other hand
thought that the Standard Oil option was more likely to mean
that the latter company would have the right to clinch an
agreement at once with the Saudi Government on the terms
offered by Ydlibi. He suggested that the Standard Oil would
probably clinch the bargain at once unless Ydlibi 1 s terms
were extremely wild.
Sir Louis Kershaw enquired whether the I.P.C.
were not missing their chance of a concession by not at
once entering into negotiations with Ibn Saud or the Sheikh.
Mr. Fraser explained that the A.P.O.C. had some time before
brought home a suitable man with a view to employing him
in negotiations with Ibn Saud but they had decided that it
was no use for the I.P.C. as a third party ? to enter into
these negotiations in view of the information that the
Standard Oil had already obtained an option on the Neutral
Zone and that Ydlibi also appeared to have reached some sort
of agreement with the Saudis. He thought that whatever terms
the I.P.C. offered would certafnly be capped at once by the
Standard Oil. In his opinion the only course open to the
I.P.C. was to approach the Sheikh of Koweit and try to obtain
from him an option in the Neutral Zone similar to that which
the Standard Oil had obtained from Ibn Saud. The result would
then be in the first instance a position of stalemate ? but he
hinted/