'File 5/1 VIII Kuwait Oil Company' [‎23r] (50/558)

this connection see my despatch C-17 , dated the 18th
January).
His Excellency then went on t o say that this
unsatisfactory situation was entirely due to our failure
to instil a " feeling of confidence ^ into the mind of the
Shaikh of Qatar. The latter clearly (and the same, said
the Shaikh, applied to every other Shaikh on the Arab
Coast) felt today that we (Hi<& Majesty’s Government) were
a "broken reed" and not to be relied on. $e talked a great
deal about the importance of treaties where they affected
her own interests, but apparently were not out to remember
our obligations to our friends #10 were in treaty relations
with us, when strong persons like Bin Saud, who we wanted
to keep in with, exerted pressure on them. The latter had
only to bully and threaten, and his victims despairing of
getting any but verbal backing from us, whom they looked to
for active support, naturally took the line of least re
sistance, and secretly agreed with Bin Saud to do all he
asked of the*\ This, of course, entirely suited the King’s
policy. He did not come out into the open and so had no
occasion to cross swords with His Majesty’s Government.
I next enquired from His Excellency how he would
deal with Qatar ek situation if he himself had the managing
of it. His reply reply was quick and to the point: "I
should immediately warn Bin Saud that Qatar was entirely
independent of Saudi Arabia and under my protection only;
that I considered the boundary to be so and so, between the
two States, and that being the case, he, Bin Saud, shodld
be careful to see that none of his Bedouin tribes committed
any acts of aggression against Qatar territory". Bin Saud,
said the Shaikh, would perfectly well understand the threat
behind such letter. "At the same time", added His Excellen
cy, "I would send a copy of my letter to the Shaikh of
Qatar