File 3516/1914 Pt 12 'German War: Persia; Bakhtiari and Bawi affairs' [‎114r] (234/330)

From Viceroy, 23rd March 1915.
Foreign Secret. Terms of peace with Turkey. As regards Mesopotamia,
we consider it essential that we should remain in permanent occupation of
the whole of Basra vilayet, namely, the tract extending from Nasirieh on
Euphrates, and Amara on Pigris to Persian frontier, on east to Mohammerab,
and Koweit on south, and to undefined boundary in desert on west. Our
reasons are that such permanent occupation (1) settles the question of
our supremacy in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . (2) It ensures safeguarding Abadan
and Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s works, and facilitating their development.
(3) It makes secure position of Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit. (4) It
will pay. (5) It solves question of. Bagdad Railway terminus, while to
abandon Basra would lie to betray Arabs and tribes Iriendly to us and shake
the confidence of Sheikhs of Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
We consider it imperative to occupy the whole of the Basra vilayet, as
our administration will thus simply and effectively replace the former
Turkish scheme of administration, which was good in principle though
defective in execution. Further, we consider that on political, economic,
and religious grounds the Bagdad vilayet should also lie ceded by I urkey,
and a native administration under our protection and control be established
there. What form that administration should take could hardly be decided
at present, owing to there being no really predominant ruling factor in the
whole of Eastern Mesopotamia. If and when we get to Bagdad solution
of this question is likely to prove easier than it looks at present. A tempo
rary solution might be the creation of a council ol Shiah and Sunni vlcmu,
under direction-of a Resident. Our Bagdad Protectorate should extend to
the north of Samara, which is a religious centre, and should comprise
Khanikin, on trade route to Persia. We are averse from increasing our
military responsibilities more than is absolutely necessary, but situation has
to be faced, and it must be realised that with an unfriendly government at
Bagdad, our political, military, and commercial position at Basra might
become very difficult.
Further, we consider that the whole property of Bagdad Kailua}
Company, its rights and privileges, should be transferred to British hands,
at any rate on such section of the railway as will pass through territory
annexed or controlled by us after the war.
As regards Persia, if she maintains nominal neutrality, we considei
that our interests will be best served if Russia can be induced, in
return for important concessions elsewhere, to relax her hold on Northern
Peisia and to give Persia a chance to revive. Russian retirement horn
Northern Persia at our instance would inspire confidence in Moslem
world, and would save us from serious additional military and civil t
obligations involved in partition. If, however, Persia definitely goes'
into the war against us, eventual partition would appear onl} course
open, and such partition might follow a line from about i a/dan
(Sharakhs) on east, passing just south of Yazd to ^ azdikhast, thence through
Madraseh to Khoramabad and thence along the boundary of the Russian zone
to near Kasrishirin. In the event of partition being inevitable, this shoulc
be our claim, but it will require more careful consideration in detail than we
have been able to give it within the last few days.
As regards Arabia, we should leave matters to settle themselves with a
benevolent attitude on our part, but with as little outside inteifeience as
possible, subject to the condition that territories of any Chiefs whose
independence we may have definitely guaranteed by treaty, e.gf., Mavia, Idrisi
and Bin Sand, shall be ceded by Turkey and remain under our protection.