Coll 15/1 'Egypt Affairs: General Situation 1931; Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936' [‎11v] (23/493)

2
I with him and prepare the way for the
achievement of this object. The Wafd,
who had boycotted the elections which
followed their dismissal, were in uncom
promising opposition, and the conditions
were reproduced in which negotiations
had been undertaken, and successfully
concluded in London, by a non-Wafdist
Prime Minister in 1929, only to be
wrecked by Wafdist sniping and subse
quent intrigue in Egypt itself. In
these circumstances His Majesty's Govern
ment had to ask themselves whether they
should negotiate with the Government in
power, or insist on the formation of a
national government such as came into
being spontaneously and conducted the suc
cessful negotiations for the treaty of 1936.
His Majesty’s Government decided that to
intervene in the sense indicated would be
in direct contradiction to their avowed
policy of respecting Egypt’s independence.
They did, however, suggest to King
Farouk, in the strictest confidence, that
his present team were perhaps not the
strongest available, and that he would do
well, having regard to historical precedent,
to consider seriously whether he should not
endeavour, by bringing about a government
on a wider basis or at least by securing the
participation of the Wafd in the Egyptian
Delegation, to safeguard Egypt from a
debacle similar to that of 1929. But it was
made very clear that this was a problem
for His Majesty to settle without British
assistance.
4. The basic objectives of His Majesty’s
Government in the prospective negotiations
were as follows : —
{a) To give effect if possible to the com
bined military and political advice
w r hich they had received that the
ideal method of safeguarding the
essential interests of the Middle East
and the British Commonwealth was
to aim at a general 'partnership
between the Middle East States and
the United Kingdom for the purpose
of mutual defence; and that the re
vised Egyptian treaty—an essential
stone in this edifice—^should be so
conceived as to dovetail into a
regional partnership of that kind.
Granted that any treaty so nego
tiated would have to conform in all
respects to the Charter of the United
Nations, it was in His Majesty’s
Government’s opinion, open to
pairs, or groups, of States to con
clude special defence arrangements
in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter, pending the entry into
force of an all-round system of inte^
national security. His Majesty’s
Government contemplated that, if
their views on these points obtained
acceptance, the security arrange
ments embodied in the revised treaty
settlement with Egypt should be
communicated to the States
Arab League (together with th^^Tu
be set on foot by His Majesty’s
Government in Palestine and else
where in the area) with a view to
their endorsement by the League and
the ultimate formation of a military
confederacy between His Majesty’s
Government and the countries of the
Middle East embracing as wide an
area as might be required;
the continuation of the Anglo-
Egyptian alliance in accordance
with the principles in articles 4-7
of the 1936 treaty and notably of
the aid promised by Egypt in case
of war or emergency (article 7).
The text of these articles is as
follows :—
Article 4
An alliance is established between
the high contracting parties with a
view to consolidating their friend
ship, their cordial understanding
and their good relations.
Article 5
Each of the high contracting
parties undertakes not to adopt in
relation to foreign countries an atti
tude which is inconsistent with the
alliance, nor to conclude political
treaties inconsistent with the pro
visions of the present treaty.
Article 6
Should any dispute with a third
State produce a situation which in
volves a risk of a rupture with that
State, the high contracting parties
will consult each other with a view
to the settlement of the said dispute
by peaceful means, in accordance
with the provisions of the Covenant
of the League of Nations and of
any other international obligations
which may be applicable to the case.
Article 7
Should, notwithstanding the pro
visions of article 6 above, either of
the high contracting parties become
engaged in war, the other high con
tracting party will, subject always