Coll 15/1 'Egypt Affairs: General Situation 1931; Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936' [‎18v] (37/493)

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honourable friend the Foreign Secretary
and the Egyptian Prime Minister were
conversations on a personal and explora
tory basis and not negotiations. They
were conducted on the understanding
that they did not commit either Govern
ment, and that they were to be treated
as confidential. I can only regret, there
fore, that incomplete reports from Egypt
should have appeared in the press.
These reports deal only with isolated
aspects of the talks, without reference
to the whole range of the other matters
dealt with in the conversations. In
view of what I have said as to the
nature of the conversations, I am sure
that honourable members will not wish
to press for further details at this
moment.
“Mr. Oliver Lyttleton: Will the
Prime Minister give the House further
information about the statement which
has appeared regarding the Sudan?
“ The Prime Minister: My right hon.
friend may rest assured that, while the
scope of the conversations included the
relationship of Great Britain and Egypt
to the Sudan, no change in the existing
status and administration of the Sudan
is contemplated and no impairment of
the right of the Sudanese people to ulti
mately to decide their own future.
“Mr. Lyttleton: May I take it, then,
that the statements attributed to the
Egyptian Prime Minister are incorrect ?
“The Pnme Minister: They seem to
be partial and misleading in so far as
they seem to announce agreements. Of
course, these are purely preliminary con
versations, and therefore there is nothing
finally negotiated; I think in that
respect my right hon. friend is correct.”
About this time Lord Stansgate
ceased to participate actively in the
negotiations.
49. The partial and one-sided character
of Sidky’s disclosures immediately created
a situation of high political tension in the
Sudan, where demonstrations and counter-
demonstrations took place, and where
the headquarters of the pro-Egyptian
(Ashigga) Party and of the Graduates’
Congress were broken up by an organised
body of supporters of the independence
movement. The newspaper controlled by
the latter became extremely intemperate,
and called for a holy war against British
and Egyptians alike. Personal attacks on
King Farouk also appeared, and the
journal was suspended for a fortnight.
Peaceful demonstrations occurred in pro
vincial centres. At the Governor-General's
instance the two religious leaders, Sayed
Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, the recognised
leader also of the independence group, and
Sayed Ali Mirghani, who is identified with
the pro-Egyptian faction, issued appeals
for order and restraint. On 3rd Nove^Ser
the Governor-General reported that the
prospects of securing willing Sudanese
acceptance of the London protocol ” had
been almost totally impaired by premature
leakages in Egypt, by Sidky Pasha’s
emphasis upon sovereignty and failure to
mention the balancing concessions by Egypt
to the Sudan, and by the use, as a transla
tion of sovereignty, of the Arabic word
“ Seyada,” meaning to the Sudanese
“mastery” or “domination.” In these
circumstances “ the co- operation of officials
and local government authorities with the
Government is bound to be greatly preju
diced.” As a result, Sir H. Huddleston
sought, and obtained, permission to proceed
to London to explain the situation fully to
His Majesty’s Government. At the
Governor-General’s request an extra
British battalion was sent to Khartoum
(from Palestine) by air.
50. In the course of his visit to London
(where he arrived on 9th November) the
Governor-General emphasised the proba
bility of force being required to maintain
public order in the Sudan if the protocol
were put into force, with the resultant
destruction of the faith of the Sudanese
in the good intentions of His Majesty’s
Government. He felt bound to record that,
if the Cabinet approved the protocol, he
could no longer be in agreement with the
sovereignty clause; but was, nevertheless,
if His Majesty’s Government so desired,
ready to continue as Governor-General and
to carry out the protocol, believing that his
personal influence might reduce the amount
of force required. His Majesty’s Govern
ment decided that they had no alternative
but to go forward on the course they had
taken, and Sir H. Huddleston was accord
ingly requested to return to Khartoum and
carry on until the future was clearer. At
the same time the Prime Minister
addressed to his Excellency a letter, which
he was authorised to show at his discretion
to selected Sudanese leaders, in the
following terms :—
‘ ‘ In the course of your visit you have
informed His Majesty’s Government of
the great anxiety aroused amongst large
sections of the Sudanese people by the
recent statements in the Egyptian press
regarding the conversations in London