Coll 15/1 'Egypt Affairs: General Situation 1931; Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936' [‎23v] (47/493)

26
Russian policy is certainly disturbing; but
it is more suspicious than dangerous, and
if the danger which it presents can arise
from its immediate and neighbouring
interests, Kgypt cannot in any case be the
country against which its first act of
aggression would take place, an act which
distance and the presence of other inter
mediate countries, placed under British
rule or influence, would render as
inexplicable as it was inoperative.
10. In brief, and whatever may be the
goodwill of the Egyptian negotiator or his
influence on his compatriots, he would find
it, if not impossible, at least very difficult
to convince them that their hopes for the
independence of their country and the
integrity of its territory will have been
substantially realised by the application of
the last suggestions contained in the
British note.
In regard to Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. personally, he
regrets that he cannot support such
suggestions, which, moreover, are far from
being in accordance with the terms of his
mandate.
11. And since in regard to Great
Britain, the friend and ally of his country,
he has obligations dictated by loyalty and
sincerity, he owes it to himself to issue a
warning that, as he has many times pointed
out, a movement of public opinion (stimu
lated to an equal degree by different causes
and currents) may at any moment trans
form itself into an action which it was
possible to repress or contain at the
beginning of the present political cam
paign, but which may subsequently elude
all control.
Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. would be grateful if the
foregoing considerations, as well as the
technical note, could be communicated to
Mr. Bevin.
(Initialled) I. S.
21s£ April, 1946.
Annex 3
Avant-projet conjoint ad referendum des
deux cotes
His Majesty The King of Great Britain,
Ireland and the British Dominions beyond
the Seas, Emperor of India, and His
Majesty the King of Egypt;
Desiring to conclude a new treaty of
mutual assistance to replace the Treaty of
Alliance signed in London on 28th August,
1936, with the object of consolidating the
friendly relations which exist between
them and of strengthening, by mutual co
operation and assistance, the contribution
which each of them will be able to makP
to the maintenance of international peace
and security in accordance with the provi
sions of the Charter of the United
Nations :
Have accordingly appointed as their
plenipotentiaries ....
Article 1
The Treaty of Alliance signed in London
on 26th August, 1936, together with the
agreed minute, notes and the Convention
of 26th August, 1936, relative to privileges
and immunities which accompanied the
said treaty, shall cease to have effect upon
the entry into force of the present treaty.
(It is understood that in the evacuation
protocol it will be mentioned that the Con
vention of 1936 on privileges and immuni
ties will continue to be applied temporarily
to the British forces during the period of
their withdrawal from Egypt.)
Article 2
The object of the mutual assistance of
the high contracting parties will be to
permit each of them to make the most
effective contribution to the maintenance of
international peace and security in accor
dance with the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations.
Article 3.
The high contracting parties undertake
not to conclude any alliance and not to
take part in any coalition directed against
one of them.
Article 4( 2 )
The high contracting parties agree that
should one of them become involved in a
war not provoked by it, and affecting Egypt
or the countries bordering on Egypt, their
respective armed forces will, 'after con
sultation, take the necessary measures, in
close collaboration, for purposes of mutual
assistance, pending action by the Security
Council.
Article 5( 2 )
The competent military authorities of
the two Governments will decide in agree
ment the manner in which the two high
contracting parties shall afford each other
mutual assistance notably as regards the
technical conditions of the collaboration
referred to in the preceding article and
suitable measures to be taken to allow the
armed forces of the two high contracting
parties to resist aggression.
( 3 ) The text of these two Articles is that pro
duced by the Egyptians and we could not agree to
them going forward as part of the “ avant-projet
conjoint.”